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Police Killings as Felony Murder
Guyora Binder* & Ekow Yankah**
The widely applauded conviction of officer Derek Chauvin for the murder of George Floyd employed the widely criticized felony murder rule. Should we use felony murder as a tool to check discriminatory and violent policing? The authors object that felony murder—although perhaps the only
murder charge available for this killing under Minnesota law—understated Chauvin’s culpability and
thereby inadequately denounced his crime. They show that further opportunities to prosecute police
for felony murder are quite limited. Further, a substantial minority of states impose felony murder
liability for any death proximately caused by a felony, even if the actual killer was a police officer, not
an “agent” of the felony. In these “proximate cause” jurisdictions, felony murder is far more often
used to prosecute the (often Black) targets of police violence, than to prosecute culpable police.
Previous scholarship on prosecution of felons for killings by police criticized such proximate
cause rules as departures from the “agency” rules required by precedent. But today’s proximate cause
felony murder rules were enacted legislatively during the War on Crime and are thus immune to this
traditional argument. The authors instead offer a racial justice critique of proximate cause felony murder rules as discriminatory in effect, and as unjustly shifting blame for reckless policing onto its victims.
Noting racially disparate patterns of charging felony murder, and particularly in cases where police
have killed, the authors call on legislatures to reimpose “agency” limits on felony murder as a prophylactic against discrimination. Finally, the authors widen this racial justice critique to encompass felony
murder as a whole, urging legislatures to abolish felony murder wherever racially disparate patterns
of charging can be demonstrated.
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I. MURDER, WITH AN ASTERISK?
On May 25, 2020 Officer Derek Chauvin of the Minneapolis Police Department was called to a convenience store to investigate a suspected counterfeit 20 dollar bill.1 Chauvin, who is white, wrestled an unarmed and nonresisting Black suspect, George Floyd, to the ground and for nine minutes,
captured on videotape, kneeled on Floyd’s neck.2 While Floyd begged for
breath, the officer stared with contempt and defiance at witnesses begging
him to release Floyd. Finally, Floyd would beg for his dead mother and utter
the all too familiar, “I can’t breathe,” before dying.3
Three weeks later, police officers Devin Brosnan and Garrett Rolfe were
summoned to an Atlanta-area Wendy’s because Rayshard Brooks, another
Black man, had fallen asleep in his car.4 After determining that Brooks’s
blood alcohol exceeded the legal limit, the officers decided to arrest him.5

1

George Floyd: What happened in the final moments of his life, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726 [https://perma.cc/4S9U-87G6].
2
Catherine Thorbecke, Derek Chauvin had his knee on George Floyd's neck for nearly 9 minutes,
complaint says, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/derek-chauvin-knee-georgefloyds-neck-minutes-complaint/story?id=70961042
[https://perma.cc/DSG6-PRW2]; State
v.
Chauvin, Sentencing Order, 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021).
3
Esme Murphy, 'I Can't Breathe!': Video Of Fatal Arrest Shows Minneapolis Officer Kneeling
On George Floyd's Neck For Several Minutes, WCCO-TV (May 26, 2020), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/26/george-floyd-man-dies-after-being-arrested-by-minneapolis-police-fbi-called-toinvestigate/ [https://perma.cc/M2HW-LNBZ].
4
Malachy Browne, Christina Kelso & Barbara Marcolini, How Rayshard Brooks Was Fatally
Shot by the Atlanta Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/us/videos-rayshard-brooks-shooting-atlanta-police.html [https://perma.cc/7M7L-4L3W].
5
Aimee Ortiz, What to Know About the Death of Rayshard Brooks, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/rayshard-brooks-what-we-know.html
[https://perma.cc/HZL9BZ7K].
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Despite Brooks’s pleas that he could walk a short way to his sister’s home,
the officers moved to handcuff him.6 The resulting struggle sent Brooks and
Brosnan to the ground. Brosnan reported that Brooks then took his taser and
tazed him. Rolfe drew his taser and fired it at Brooks, hitting him.7 Brooks
ran, turning and firing Brosnan’s taser over Rolfe’s head. Rolfe fired his gun,
hitting Brooks twice and killing him. A third shot hit an occupied vehicle.8
Searing videos of these killings ignited waves of protest unseen in generations.9 At the forefront of the racial justice issues raised in their wake were
calls for less violent and discriminatory policing and demands that police who
unjustifiably kill be prosecuted with all tools available.10 Facing enormous
public scrutiny, prosecutors charged the police officers involved in these
high-profile killings with a slew of crimes, including, most seriously, felony
murder.11
The felony murder charges sent legal observers puzzling through the intricacies of the felony murder law and the “merger doctrine” that would preclude such charges in most states.12 For criminal law reformers and social
justice advocates, these felony murder charges forced a reckoning. On the
one hand lay the long-standing academic disdain for felony murder liability,
stretched to its furthest limits in these cases.13 On the other lay the imperative
to prosecute killer cops who for so long have seemed above the law.14 Thus,
6

Id.
Id.
8
Richard Fausset & Shaila Dewan, Police Decisions Are Scrutinized After Rayshard Brooks's
Fatal Encounter, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/us/rayshardbrooks-police-tactics.html [https://perma.cc/WY3K-KRHL].
9
How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, N.Y. TIMES (November 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html? [https://perma.cc/K26N-T4DY].
10
Id.
11
4 Minnesota police officers fired after death of unarmed black man, BBC NEWS, (May 27,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52806572 [https://perma.cc/7QCU-TUB2];
Fausset & Dewan, supra note 8. On another notorious racist killing of 2020 resulting in felony murder
charges, see Ekow Yankah, Ahmaud Arbery, Reckless Racism, and Hate Crimes, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681
(2021).
12
Kyron Huigens, Minn. Should Consider Another Charge in the George Floyd Case, LAW360
(August 2, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1291283/minn-should-consider-another-chargein-george-floyd-case [https://perma.cc/W5D8-3UK6]. For explication and analysis of the merger doctrine, see Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 518-551 (2011).
13
Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337 (2018); Aya
Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 129 (2014); Guyora Binder, The
Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 Notre Dame L. REV. 965, 966 (2008) (surveying academic indictments of felony murder) [hereinafter Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder]; Guyora Binder, The
Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 60 (2004) (same) [hereinafter Binder,
Origins of American Felony Murder]; Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446 (1985); Hava Dayan, Assaultive
Femicide and the American Felony-Murder Rule, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1 (2016).
14
Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839 (2019) (noting the protections afforded
police defendants but cautioning against a carceral solution to policing harms); Kate Levine, Police
Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 997 (2021); Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H.
McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213 (2016); James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice,
7
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scholars and activists struggled to reconcile their decarceral commitments
with their insistence on police accountability.15
But the public was generally unmoved by such scruples. Outraged by
news reports of violent officers remaining unpunished and unrestrained,16 the
public would accept no less than prosecutors' best efforts to convict offending
officers of murder.17 Accustomed to seeing prosecutors deploy enormous advantages against unpopular suspects on behalf of privileged victims, they demanded no less for Floyd and Brooks. If a felony murder rule was the shortest
path to punishment, most did not care exactly what violent police were punished for.18 Thus, when Chauvin was finally convicted and sentenced in June
2021 to twenty-two and a half years, many Americans, and particularly Black
Americans, felt vindication.19 That this penalty was imposed for the morally
ambiguous offense of an inadvertently fatal assault was hardly noticed.20 To
be sure, Chauvin was also convicted of third degree murder for “causing . . .
death . . . by means of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a
depraved mind, without regard for human life,”21 but that conviction added
nothing to his penalty, because—paradoxically—it was considered the lesser
charge.

Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 280–291 (2011) (discussing
incentives to use felony murder to secure otherwise unavailable sentences, including capital sentences.)
15
Aya Gruber, The Feminist War On Crime: The Unexpected Role of Women’s Liberation in
Mass Incarceration 46-50, 199-204 (2020)(abolitionist critique of progressive criminalization strategies; Kate Levine, The Progressive Love Affair With the Carceral State, 120 Mich. L. Rev. 1225, 12321240 (critiquing progressive proposals to prosecute police and hate crimes);; Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 Fordham L. Rev.
3211, 3215-3228 (conflict between punishing crimes against minority and female victims and racial
justice critque of carceral state).
16
John Eligon, Tim Arango, Shaila Dewan & Nicholas Bogel-Burrough, Derek Chauvin Verdict
Brings a Rare Rebuke of Police Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/us/george-floyd-chauvin-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/YA9S-BK6H]; Lorita
Copeland Daniels & Rosa Castillo Krewson, How Black Lives Matter Demands Accountability of Twitter – and When It Works, WASH. POST (July 29, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/29/how-black-lives-matter-demands-accountability-twitter-when-it-works/
[https://perma.cc/3XR7-HJFM].
17
Emma Tucker, Mark Morales & Priya Krishnakumar, Why It’s Rare for Police Officers to be
Convicted of Murder, CNN, (April 21, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/us/police-convictedmurder-rare-chauvin/index.html [https://perma.cc/G7XY-V8GT]; Levine, supra note 14; Huq &
McAdams, supra note 14.
18
Gideon Yaffe, The Lucky Legal Accident that Led to Derek Chauvin’s Conviction, THE HILL
(May 1, 2021), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/551322-the-lucky-legal-accident-that-ledto-derek-chauvins-conviction/ [https://perma.cc/P7ZS-R8V3].
19
Joshua Jamerson & Arian Campo-Flores, Black Americans Greet Derek Chauvin’s Conviction
with Relief, Caution, WALL ST. J. (April 20, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/black-americansgreet-derek-chauvin-conviction-with-relief-caution-11618963514 [https://perma.cc/WY5U-ARYA].
20
Yaffe, supra note 18 (noting that Minnesota’s felony murder law is unusual in requiring no
felony other than the act causing death).
21
MINN. STAT. § 609.195 (2020).
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Moreover, this depraved mind murder conviction will very likely be overturned on appeal.22 Chauvin’s trial was only the second time a police officer
had been convicted of murder in Minnesota.23 The first was the 2018 conviction of Officer Mohamed Noor for third degree (i.e. depraved indifference)
murder.24 In an inversion of the typical racial script, the Somali-American
Noor, shot and killed the white Australian Justine Damond, while responding
to her call to report a possible assault.25 Many racial justice advocates were
troubled that a Black police officer’s killing of a white victim elicited the
conviction that has proved so elusive when white officers have killed Black
victims.26 Yet three months after Chauvin’s conviction, Noor’s conviction for
third-degree murder was overturned by the Minnesota Supreme Court.27 The
Court held this offense could not be charged where an offender’s actions endangered one person rather than a number of people.28 We regard this interpretation of depraved indifference as profoundly mistaken: selective indifference to the welfare of Black suspects increases the depravity of many police
killings. Depraved indifference seemed to precisely describe Chauvin’s attitude toward the person dying beneath him. Yet the Noor decision meant that
in retrospect, the felony murder charge was the only way to convict Chauvin
of murder in Minnesota, short of finding that he killed intentionally.29
Thus the felony murder prosecutions of Floyd and Brooks pose a genuine
dilemma: Should we celebrate deployment of prosecutorial privilege to ease
conviction of homicidal police? Or does this shortcut mark these convictions
with an asterisk, signifying only the power of the state to punish whoever it
pleases? We share the hunger to use potent prosecutorial tools to control racist police violence. Yet punishing police officers for felony murder in such

22

Matt Cannon, Derek Chauvin has a shot at appeal success. Here’s why, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 22,
2022),
https://www.newsweek.com/derek-chauvin-appeal-success-why-1632485
[https://perma.cc/ZD9Y-LU3W]; Appellant's Brief, Minnesota v. Chauvin, No. A21-1228 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 23, 2021).
23
Emily Haavik, Derek Chauvin Found Guilty of Murder, Manslaughter in Death of George
Floyd, KARE11 (April 20, 2021) https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/george-floyd/derekchauvin-guilty-murder-manslaughter-george-floyd-death/89-aa32108a-288e-4c62-af7de42d98589c7e [https://perma.cc/LW4M-Q86G].
24
Id.
25
Justin Damond: U.S. Policeman Guilty of Australian’s Murder, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48113953 [https://perma.cc/9JWT-WZUR]; Jon Collins
& Riham Feshir, Did Race Color the Noor Verdict? Questions Linger for Some, MPR NEWS (May 10,
2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/05/10/police-trial-shooting-justine-damond-ruszczykaustralia-race-color-verdict [https://perma.cc/98P5-WMEW].
26
Collins & Feshir, supra note 26.
27
Noor remains convicted of second-degree manslaughter. Jon Collins, Brian Bakst & Peter Cox,
MN Supreme Court Tosses 3rd-Degree Murder Conviction of Ex-Cop Noor, MPR NEWS (September
15, 2021) https://sahanjournal.com/policing-justice/mn-supreme-court-tosses-3rddegree-murder-conviction-of-excop-noor/ [https://perma.cc/PX64-SUMV].
28
Id.
29
Id.
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emblematic cases poses profound dangers.30 Even those who accept punishment as a legitimate response to crime should hesitate. Criminal law influences not only by threatening punishment, but also by expressing collective
judgments. In a democracy, it speaks for us. What are we expressing in calling these killings felony murders? Does such a conviction aptly name and
denounce these wrongs?
At its best, felony murder condemns and punishes an inadvertent killing,
because the risk of death was imposed in furtherance of a second grave
wrong.31 This account exposes two problems with these cases. First, these
killings were not—and police killings typically are not—inadvertent. Punishing them as felony murder understates this culpability regarding death and
thereby undeservedly exculpates the killer. Next, what is the second wrong
here? Is it racial subordination? Or arrogantly prioritizing police authority or
safety over the lives of civilians? If these are the motives we want to denounce, we will need the underlying felony to reflect this wrong: perhaps a
hate crime or a civil rights violation, not an assault.
Moreover, another message expressed by a felony murder conviction
should trouble us. This is the sentiment that felony murder liability is summary justice meted out only to those beyond the circle of our mutual concern.
Unfortunately, this became a common way of thinking about punishment during the “War on Crime,”32 as rising penal severity expanded prosecutorial
discretion,33 enabling “pretextual prosecution” of those suspected of hard-toprove major crimes.34 Lengthy recidivist sentences aimed at “incapacitation”
further disconnected penalties from crimes.35 Prosecutors increasingly used
heightened penalties to coercively recruit informants to inculpate others,

30
Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV 997, 10091033(2021); Aya Gruber Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy 85 U. Colo. L. rev. 129, 134-136
(2014); Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra n. 15, at 3215-3217.
31
See Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, supra n. 13, at 991-1000, 1032-1046 (proposing
that negligent killing deserves more severe condemnation when an apparent risk is imposed to further
an independent wrongful purpose); Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, supra n. 12 at 433-437
(same); and Section II.B infra.
32
ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1–2 (2017) [Herinafter HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR
ON CRIME]; See also ELIZABETH HINTON, AMERICA ON FIRE: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE
AND BLACK REBELLION SINCE THE 1960’S (2021) [Herinafter HINTON, AMERICA ON FIRE]; MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
33
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 236–243,
251–274 (2011).; see also JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
34
William J. Stuntz and Dan Richman, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy
of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COL. L. REV. 583 (2005); STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE supra note 33, 269–274.
35
Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist Critique, 54 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1, 1-2, 5-11 (2017); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment,
91 VA. L. REV. 677, 681-683 (2005)
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including the innocent.36 Criminal justice increasingly seemed a vicious and
cynical team sport. In this context, felony murder, with its disconnect between conduct and label, its disproportion between culpability and penalty,
and its unfairly broad complicity, seemed emblematic rather than anomalous.
Like a “Three Strikes” recidivist sentence, a felony murder conviction
seemed a condemnation of the person rather than the offense.37 Disproportion
seemed its very point. Indeed, the appeal of felony murder liability for brutal
police may inhere in its very arbitrariness. After police have long enjoyed
undue power and impunity, arbitrary punishment may feel like poetic justice.
But before we declare “war” on police violence, we should reflect on the
history of this metaphor and the discrimination inherent in a regime punishing
dangerous dispositions and associations. Drawing on the research of Elizabeth Hinton, we will recall the War on Crime as a reaction against Black
protest, that racialized the political issue of “crime.”38 The discriminatory use
of felony murder liability is particularly apparent in cases of police violence.
In a substantial minority of states, prosecutors can and do use felony murder
rules to prosecute arrestees rather than police for killings committed by police.39 Thus, felony murder charges have often shift blame for unreasonably
violent law enforcement onto its targets.
In a majority of felony murder states, such charges would be precluded
by an "agency rule," confining felony murder liability to killings by parties
to the felony.40 But when Floyd and Brooks were killed, 15 states, representing 47% the American population, applied a broader “proximate cause” rule,
imposing liability for all deaths foreseeable as a result of the felony, even if
directly caused by police.41 Thus, many felony murder rules, including Georgia’s (but not Minnesota’s), absolve culpable police officers of less visible
racist killings by shifting blame onto their victims. Since Floyd’s death, two

36
Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 107, 1009-1012(2006); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Instiutional and
Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 645-646, 651-660, 663-677 (2004); Michael A.
Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6-21
(2003)
37
For a critique of punishing character rather than conduct, see generally Ekow N. Yankah, Good
Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019 (2004)(character theory encourages modern caste formation, reinforcing group subordination).
38
HINTON, AMERICA ON FIRE, supra note 32.
39
See Parts III & IV infra.
40
See text accompanying footnotes 170, 228-257 infra.
41
Until 2021, these included Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Georgia, New Jersey, Arizona, Indiana, Missouri, Wisconsin, Colorado, Alabama, Oklahoma, and Alaska, however Illinois and
Colorado adopted agency rules in 2021.See text and accompanying footnotes 117-119, 267-300 infra.
For state populations, see https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/08/more-than-half-of-unitedstates-counties-were-smaller-in-2020-than-in-2010.html#:~:text=California%20was%20the%20most%20populous,half%20of%20the%20U.S.%20population.

8

Harvard Law & Policy Review

[Vol. 17

more states adopted agency limitations as racial justice reforms,42 but felony
murder still extends to all proximately caused deaths in 13 states.
Prosecuting felons for police killings under this standard normalizes unreasonably violent and dangerous policing, almost requiring felons to expect
it.43 This proximate cause standard has been criticized for its vulnerability to
hindsight bias—ex ante rare events tend to look inevitable after they occur.44
But in a context of race discrimination, this inflation of danger is even more
disturbing. It is sadly "foreseeable" that police kill Black civilians at 2.5 times
the rate at which they kill whites.45 Under a foreseeability test, Black felons
may therefore be punished for attracting even unreasonable police violence.
If prosecutors and juries already overattribute danger to putative felons, perhaps they will see a violent police response as particularly predictable when
the suspect is Black.46 Holding Black felons responsible to anticipate not just
an excessive, but also a discriminatory response, is particularly ugly.
“Agency” limits confined felony murder to deaths directly caused by
felons throughout the nineteenth century.47 After World War II, some courts
fashioned broader proximate cause rules—unconfined by agency limits—as
weapons in an imagined war against criminals. Eventually, courts in almost

42

See text accompanying notes 117-119 infra.
See text and accompanying footnotes 350-404 infra.
44
Martin Lijtmaer, Comment, The Felony Murder Rule in Illinois: The Injustice of the Proximate
Cause Theory Explored via Research in Cognitive Psychology, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,
621–624 (2008); Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2003); Binder, Origins of American Felony Murder, supra note 13, at 462–463.
45
See Wesley Lowery, Aren’t more white people than black people killed by police? Yes, but no.,
WASH. POST (JULY 11, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/11/arent-more-white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-police-yes-but-no/ There remains a debate about
whether the police are more likely to use lethal violence in identical situations. Compare Roland G.
Fryer Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1210
(2017)(observing racial disparity in police nonlethal force in one city, but none in fatal shootings when
controlling for situational factors such as being stopped) and Steven Durlauf & James Heckman, An
Empirical Analysis of Police Use of Force: A comment 128 J. POL. ECON. 3998 (2020)(failure to observe effect of race on situational factors predicting shootings, such as being stopped, renders absence
of observed racial disparity in shootings uninformative); see also, Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park,
Charles M. Judd, Bernd Wittenbrink, Melody S. Sadler, & Tracie Keesee, Across the Thin Blue Line:
Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL1006,
1015 (2007). Others point out that racism in both policing and larger social structures can lead to
disproportionate violence by generating situations where lethal force seems “necessary.” Michael
Siegel, Racial Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings: An Empirical Analysis Informed by Critical Race
Theory, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1077-1085 (2020)(correlating racial disparities in probability of being
fatally shot by police with level of residential segregation and other indices of structural racism); MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE https://mappingpoliceviolence.org [https://perma.cc/6XZP-MH4V] (last updated March 31, 2022).
46
Police often treat Black neighborhoods as more threatening in disproportion to any evidencet.
Brad W. Smith & Malcolm D. Holmes, Police Use of Excessive Force in Minority Communities: A
Test of the Minority Threat, Place, and Community Accountability Hypotheses, 61 SOC. PROBS. 83, 86–
87 (2014).
47
Binder, Origins of American Felony Murder, supra note 13, at 96. See also Norval Morris, The
Felon’s Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50 (1956).
43
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all states invoked precedent to reestablish agency limits. But soon most states
enacted new codes in the face of rising crime and calls for increasing penal
severity.48 Broader proximate cause felony murder rules were written or read
into many of these new codes. So while an agency limit remains the majority
rule, neither courts nor scholars have supported it with any normative rationale. One contribution of this essay is to do so: an agency rule prevents
discriminatory prosecutorial decisions that shift blame onto the victims of
discriminatory police violence. Such blame-shifting exacerbates police violence by intimidating, discrediting, and silencing surviving witnesses. Three
recent cases aptly illustrate how proximate cause felony murder rules provide
camouflage in the War on Crime.
In 2012, John Givens, Leland Dudley and David Strong, all unarmed
Black men, burglarized an electronics store in Chicago, and loaded up the
store’s van with loot. When police surrounded the store, the three attempted
escape by backing the van through a garage door. One officer was grazed by
the van. Officers fired 77 shots into the van, killing Strong. Dudley took five
bullets, and lost 40% of his skull, suffering brain damage. Givens was shot
eight times. Both were convicted of felony murder, even though two members of the Independent Police Review Authority found the shootings unjustified (both members were fired for their candor). In 2021, Illinois adopted
an agency rule as part of a broad criminal justice reform bill. Givens has been
pardoned by the Governor and a jury awarded Strong’s family one million
dollars.49
In 2018, Columbus police set up stings to catch aspiring robbers advertising merchandise on social media. A police decoy would meet the seller,
accompanied by a concealed SWAT officer. When the suspected robber
showed a weapon, the sniper would shoot him. After police shot and killed
Julius Tate, a Black 16 year old, prosecutors charged his 16 year old sweetheart, Masonique Saunders, also Black, with felony murder. She helped set
up the meeting, but was not present at the scene.50 Tate was the second suspect shot in this operation within a week. After much protest, prosecutors
allowed Saunders to plead to manslaughter. The killer won a medal.

48

Part IV infra.
Maya Duknasova, Chicago May Pay $1M to Estate of Man Killed in Burglary Try, US NEWS
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In 2020, 15-year-old Latino, Stavian Rodriguez, and 17-year-old Caucasian, Wyatt Cheatham, attempted to rob a gas station in Oklahoma City.51
During the robbery, the hapless Rodriguez returned to the scene, was locked
inside the store by the clerk and surrounded by police.52 Moments after police
joked that he was probably calling his Mom, Rodriguez set down his gun and
attempted to surrender. He was shot 13 times by 5 officers and killed.53
Cheatham, 17, not even on the scene, was charged with felony murder, while
prosecutors resisted mounting public pressure to prosecute the actual killers.54
In each case, police unnecessarily used deadly force, and prosecutors
charged absent or unarmed defendants with murder. These cases display a
disturbing symmetry between disproportionate police violence and disproportionate prosecution. Indeed, the more unreasonable police violence becomes, the more capacious felony murder liability must become to shift
blame onto victims. The resulting murder charges presume police violence is
deserved by its victims. Thus, the availability of such felony murder liability
creates perverse incentives for both police and prosecutors.55 Moreover, the
targets of these prosecutions are disproportionately people of color. The war
on crime was not only an escalation of policing and punishment, but specifically a racialized escalation,56 with racial disparity at every stage in the process.57 Black people are not only disproportionately victimized by police violence, but also disproportionately punished for felony murder,58 and disproportionately charged with felony murder when they attract police violence.59
The prospect of race discrimination has often motivated prophylactic restrictions on law enforcement.60 Vagrancy offenses were deemed unconstitutionally vague, because the discretion these crimes afforded police was a
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playground for prejudice.61 Juries, lawyers, and exclusionary rules likewise
serve as checks against discrimination.62 We present felony murder as a similar site for discrimination and offer agency rules as a necessary prophylactic—the example of Illinois should be followed in other states that lack
agency rules.
But while agency rules are necessary prophylactics, they may not be sufficient. Discrimination risk inheres not just in the attribution of police killings
to felons but also in the more common attribution of felony murder to cofelons. In turn, our racial justice critique of proximate cause rules can also
indict felony murder more broadly, wherever data reveals grossly disparate
patterns of charging. One aim in reflecting on felony murder liability for police violence is to refresh the familiar critique of felony murder. That felony
murder liability is often undeserved is a reason to narrow it. But that it has
been imposed selectively by race is a reason—maybe our best reason—to
abolish it altogether.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. Part Two explains the varieties of
felony murder liability, and their application to both felons who cause death
and accomplices who do not. It explains traditional criticisms and defenses
of felony murder and reports on recent reform efforts. Part Three examines
how and when felony murder can apply to police, in cases where police kill,
and considers whether such liability can properly label and denounce their
culpability. Next, it examines the implications of merger limitations, which
properly preclude felony murder prosecutions of police predicated on assault
in the great majority of states. Finally, it notes the rarity of laws punishing
civil rights violations as felonies and proposes proliferating these, but not
necessarily as predicates for felony murder. Part Four shows how felony murder can apply to suspected felons in cases where police kill. It discusses
agency limitations, which preclude holding felons liable for police killings in
most states, and the elimination of such agency limits in a substantial minority of states. It shows, moreover, that the postwar cases extending felon liability to such killings relied on a conception of law enforcement as warfare
that should be seen as an early example of War on Crime rhetoric. Part Four
also explicates Dean Norval Morris’s influential doctrinal defense of agency
limitations, showing how it was obsoleted by new tough-on-crime codes that
left agency rules without a rationale. Part Five proposes racial justice as that
rationale, recalling the centrality of racial subordination and systematic police

61
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158-159, 162, 170-171 (potential for race
discrimination in enforcing vagrancy laws, illustrated by facts of case) (1972); Guyora Binder & Brenner M. Fissell, A Political Interpretation of Vagueness Doctrine, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1527, 1529,
1541-42(discussing Papachristou) (2019); Risa Goluboff, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960’S (2016) 247-248, 298-332.
62
Norris v. Alabama 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Powell v.
Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Brown v. Mississippi 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
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violence in the War on Crime, and identifying felony murder prosecution of
victims of police violence as a tactic in that war. Further, it justifies an agency
limitation as a prophylactic against the discriminatory abuse of felony murder. Lastly, it proposes depraved indifference as a better test for assessing the
culpability of both police and felons for death in cases where police kill. We
conclude in Part Six, extending our racial justice critique from proximate
cause variants of felony murder, to all felony murder. Returning to the problem of prosecuting police killings, we voice two concerns about using felony
murder to prosecute police: it understates their culpability and legitimates a
tool of racial subordination.
II. THE FELONY MURDER PROBLEM
Let us first introduce felony murder liability and provide background
on when, how and why felony murder liability can apply to police and felons,
in cases where police kill.
A. Felony Murder Defined
By "felony murder," we refer to any murder offense conditioned on killing in the commission or attempt of a felony but with less culpability than
otherwise required for murder. Since almost all states punish some reckless
killings as murder, the term is best applied to killings conditioned on negligence towards death or strict liability. By this measure, 41 states, the federal
system, and the District of Columbia have felony murder rules.63
Felony murder rules have a second distinctive feature: they can impose murder liability not only on those who killed in the course of a felony,
but also on their accomplices in the felony, even if they had no intention to
aid or encourage a killing. About a third of felony murder statutes impose
liability on any participant in a felony that causes death.64 In these collective
liability states, each felon's liability depends on the causal attribution of the
death to the felony. Typically, such causation requires that the death be foreseeable as a consequence of the felony; sometimes it also requires that the act

63
The exceptions: Hawaii requires intent to kill for all murder. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707–701
(2022); Arkansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
and Vermont, require at least recklessness with respect to death for murder in the course of a felony,
although Arkansas defines such murder as “causes the death of any person . . . under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” ARK. CODE ANN. §5-10-101 (2022); KY. REV. STAT.
Ann. §507.020 (West 2022); Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173, 1194 (Mass. 2017) (Gants,
J., concurring); (Mass. 2017); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 326-327 (Mich. 1980); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §630:1-b, §626:7(2); State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1208 (N.M. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE.
12.1-02-02, 12.1-16-01(1)(C) (2021); N.D. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTION K-6.03 (2019); State v. Doucette,
470 A.2d 676, 682-683 (Vt. 1983).
64
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causing death “further” the felony. This furthering requirement appears to
exclude killings by those resisting the crime, such as crime victims and the
police, but in some jurisdictions it is not so applied. 65
In the remaining jurisdictions, the murder liability of co-felons depends
on their complicity in the killing. Yet courts in these complicity states have
conditioned complicity in the killing on criteria similar to those governing
causation in the collective liability states. Almost all confine complicity to
killings foreseeable as a result of the felony and most also require that the
killings be in furtherance of the felony.66 Both types of rules extend liability
for the killing to accomplices in the felony who did not kill, or intentionally
aid or encourage killing. By contrast, accomplice liability is usually limited
to those crimes the accomplice intentionally aided or encouraged.67
B. Historical Origins
Felony murder is less ancient than is sometimes supposed.68 The distinction between murder and manslaughter dates only from the sixteenth century in English law and was not originally defined by distinct culpable mental
states. To be sure, murder required "malice," but malice was a normative conclusion about the absence of certain excusing and mitigating circumstances
rather than a particular mental state. Both murder and manslaughter required
(1) “killing”—fatal injury directly inflicted with a weapon—and (2) the absence of such "excuses" as self-defense, insanity or “accident” (as when the
weapon was not intentionally aimed at a person). If the killing was provoked
or arose from mutual combat, it lacked "malice" and was graded as manslaughter. During the sixteenth century, a limited doctrine of accessorial liability was adopted, holding conspirators who agreed together to use deadly
force to overcome resistance to a crime (not necessarily a felony) responsible
for such uses of deadly force.69
A doctrine that all participants in an unintentionally fatal felony
would be liable for murder was proposed as dictum by Justice Holt in the
early eighteenth century English decision of R. v. Plummer.70 Holt's idea was
then endorsed in several eighteenth century treatises, including Blackstone’s.71 Yet it does not appear to have been actually applied in England
before the American Revolution, and was not regularly applied there until
well into the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it was legislatively codified in
many American states—notably Georgia, Illinois, New York and
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Id. at 501–510.
67
GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER 217 (2012).
68
See Binder, Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, supra note 13, at 60–66.
69
Id. at 73–70.
70
Id. at 88–89.
71
Id. at 89–97.
66

14

Harvard Law & Policy Review

[Vol. 17

California—beginning in the second decade of the nineteenth century.72 In
many other states—notably Pennsylvania, Virginia and Massachusetts—statutes instead aggravated murder to the first degree if committed in the course
of certain felonies. Over the course of the nineteenth century, courts read
these grading statutes as imposing first degree murder liability for unintended
killing in the course of these felonies.73
During the nineteenth century, felony murder liability was largely
confined to a short list of predicate felonies, usually including robbery, arson,
rape or burglary. A slow expansion of the meaning of killing to embrace indirect causation eventually expanded the scope of felony murder during the
late nineteenth century. But almost all cases of remote causation dated from
the century's last decade. Only one case, in 1900, involved an intervening
actor: train robbers used the victim as a shield, forcing him into the path of
gunfire.74 Beginning in the 1930's felony murder liability in some states encompassed killings by police or others resisting the felony, on the theory that
the felony had "proximately caused" such resistance. This doctrine will be
examined and criticized in detail in Part IV below.
C. The Normative Problem
The normative questions posed by felony murder are whether it conditions liability on sufficient culpability to satisfy desert, and if not, whether
it is defensible on consequentialist grounds.
Felony murder rules are often described as imposing strict liability for
any death, which seems to imply that felony murder liability cannot be deserved. But whether that is so depends on what we mean by strict liability. If
strict liability means liability without moral fault, strict liability for the very
serious crime of murder would obviously be unfair. Liability without moral
fault is sometimes referred to as “substantive strict liability.”75 By contrast,
the American Law Institute’s 1962 Model Penal Code offers what has been
called a “formal”76 conception of strict liability. It conditions criminal liability on proof of a mental state like corresponding to each element. Under the
Code, one must purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently perform any
forbidden act or cause any forbidden harm to be guilty of any jailable
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offense.77 The Code’s scheme has had great influence among legal scholars78
and considerable influence on the law.79
Yet it is easy to think of examples of offenses involving moral fault
without satisfying this formal requirement of correspondence between act
and mental state. Consider causing death with intent to torture.80 Here is a
terrible crime comprising a very bad mental state and a very bad result, yet
the two do not correspond. Next consider a crime defined as causing death
by means of torture: here we require a bad act and a bad result but no mental
state at all. These crimes obviously involve fault and are substantively culpable. We may say that an intent to torture implies some culpable awareness of
a risk of death. The second crime requires no mental state, but because the
forbidden conduct of torture is very dangerous to life, it seems culpable “per
se.”81 Thus we can see how a sufficiently malign and dangerous felony could
supply enough moral fault to merit murder liability, without requiring any
mental state corresponding to death. But that does not mean that every felony
murder crime does,
One illuminating example of conduct culpable per se is use of a
deadly weapon. In fact, for much of the history of the common law, weapons
mattered much more than mental states in proving murder. The forbidden act
was “killing,” not causing death. Killing connoted an attack with a weapon
or some other obviously apt means like strangulation or poison. Once it was
established, a culpable attitude of malice was presumed, and the burden
would fall to the defendant to show the deadly means were used unintentionally.82 Mental states only became important as the conduct required for murder expanded to include causing death remotely by any means, as occurred in
both English and American law during the nineteenth century.83 As our later
discussion of felony murder causation standards will reveal, standards of
causal responsibility for death can matter just as much as mental states in
aligning criminal liability with moral fault.
Today, felony murder often involves formal strict liability, but rarely
involves substantive strict liability. Only five of 41 felony murder statutes
explicitly condition the offense on negligence toward or foreseeability of
death.84 Eight states and the federal system condition felony murder on
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“malice,” although whether this requires any culpability beyond the intent to
commit the felony is often unclear.85 Still, we might view dangerous predicate felonies like robbery and arson as inherently manifesting some culpability towards death. Both also involve non-corresponding culpability toward
another wrong: theft, in the case of robbery, and destruction of property in
the case of arson.
If certain felonies pose a reasonably apparent danger to life, their
commission would be per se negligent. Among our 41 felony murder states,
22 exhaustively enumerate the felonies that can serve as predicates to felony
murder liability. Most often, the felonies enumerated are robbery, burglary,
rape, arson, escape, and kidnapping. Courts and commentators often view
these predicates as especially dangerous, and some codes refer to them as
such.86 The remaining 19 felony murder states predicate at least some felony
murders on non-enumerated felonies. In at least 14 of these states, the felony
must be dangerous or involve the use of a deadly weapon.87 Predicate felonies, on this view, are analogous to drunk driving: actions we understand are
dangerous and that can easily go fatally wrong.
Culpability can also inhere in criteria of causal responsibility. Thus,
conditioning causal responsibility for death on its foreseeability makes causation per se negligent toward that result.88 Of 41 felony murder states, 29
have clearly required foreseeability for causation, while only three have
clearly rejected it.89 Conditioning accomplice liability on foreseeability of
death can extend this negligence requirement to accomplices.90 Thus, most
felony murder rules can be seen as per se negligence rules with respect to
death.
In addition to this negligence, most felony murder rules require non-corresponding culpability towards another harm through two principles. First,
most states impose causation limitations by requiring that the act causing
death further the predicate felony. Thus, if a plane coincidentally and fatally
crashes while smuggling drugs, the lack of a relationship between the crime
and death disables a felony murder conviction.91
Second, most states restrict predicate felonies to those other than homicide or assault. If a state could predicate felony murder on a lesser homicide
like manslaughter, that offense would effectively be eliminated. Similarly, if
a state was able to prosecute any fatal assault as felony murder, it would
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effectively erase any other grade of homicide. Every killing, whether reckless, provoked, or the freakish result of a punch could be punished as murder.
This limitation on felony murder, often called a “merger” limit, is achieved
in two ways. Some state codes exhaustively enumerate predicate felonies and
simply leave out assault and lesser forms of homicide. Other codes allow
courts to decide which felonies can support felony murder. In such states,
courts often impose a merger limit as judicial doctrine.
Of 22 states exhaustively enumerating predicate felonies, none conditions
felony murder on the manslaughter of the victim. Only four enumerate felony
assault as a predicate felony. One uses drive-by shooting and 10 use felony
child abuse as predicates. Merger doctrines exclude lesser homicide felonies
and assault felonies in many of the remaining 19 jurisdictions with non-enumerated felonies, but five have rejected the merger doctrine.92 As will be explained in part III, merger doctrines and related limits on predicate felonies
prevent felony murder prosecution of police for unreasonable killings in most
states.
So substantively, felony murder generally does not impose strict liability.
It almost always requires some moral fault. But that does not mean felony
murder requires enough fault to warrant condemnation and punishment as
murder. Accordingly, felony murder liability has faced vigorous criticism
from its inception.93 In 1846 the English Law Commissioners wrote:
If the punishment for stealing from the person be too light, let it be
increased, and let the increase fall alike on all the offenders! Surely
the worst mode of increasing the punishment of an offence is to provide that, besides the ordinary punishment, every offender shall run
an exceedingly small risk of being hanged.94
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James Stephen regarded felony murder liability as "cruel... and indeed
monstrous."95 In the U.S., the Model Penal Code rejected felony murder,
commenting that "principled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine
is hard to find."96 Sanford Kadish condemned felony murder liability as "rationally indefensible."97 Nelson Roth and Scott Sundby argued that felony
murder violates the constitution, by either punishing severely without culpability, or presuming culpability without proof.98 Among former common law
jurisdictions, England, Ireland, Canada and India have abolished felony murder.99 However, two Australian states have limited felony murder rules, and
two punish negligent unlawful act murder.100
Assuming that murder liability for inadvertent killing during a felony
is undeserved, can it nevertheless be defended on consequentialist grounds,
as a crime control measure? Might felony murder rules deter the commission
of the underlying predicate felonies? Not likely, as empirical studies show
that while raising the certainty of punishment marginally increases deterrence, raising the severity of punishment generally does not.101 As the Law
Commissioners argued, attaching punishment to an infrequent consequence
of a felony establishes a punishment lottery, which should have no deterrent
effect.
Nor can felony murder liability easily be justified as a deterrent to killing
by those engaged in the felony. While one might argue that absolving the
prosecution of proving culpability increases the certainty of punishment, this
argument proves too much. Relieving prosecutors of proving any offense element increases the probability of punishing the guilty—and the probability
of punishing the innocent. If, as many social scientists believe, most compliance is motivated by trust in the fairness and legitimacy of law rather than
fear of sanctions,102 proof of guilt is an important contributor to crime control.
95
96
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If felony murder is just a thumb prosecutors can selectively press on the scales
of justice, who will most often be punished without proof of guilt? Indeed, in
a criminal justice system affording prosecutors unreviewed discretion, within
a society rife with race discrimination, a doctrine permitting punishment
without proof might so corrode legitimacy as to counsel against its use at all.
If deterrence cannot justify felony murder liability, it seems we cannot
avoid the question of deserved punishment. So can felony murder liability
ever be defended as deserved? Perhaps some felonies are so dangerous that
they are per se reckless to human life. But these will be few: even robbery
and arson cause death only about 1% of the time.103 Nor can we morally
equate an intention to commit another wrong with an intention to kill. Among
crimes against persons, the Supreme Court permits capital punishment only
for murder on the view that homicide is categorically worse.104
But what if we combine culpability towards death with culpability towards another grave wrong? Take Harry Goldvarg, a Chicago butcher, who
in 1930 paid two men to burn his butcher shop so that he could recover insurance. What could possibly go wrong? The resulting fire and explosion
killed two children who, as Goldvarg knew, lived with their parents behind
the adjoining drygoods store.105 Similarly, in 1973, Charlie Ware and Darius
Slater robbed a motel clerk at gunpoint. What could possibly go wrong?
Ware’s thumb slipped off the pistol’s hammer, it fired, killing the clerk.106
These killings are grossly negligent in so far as the actors did not consider
obvious risks. While it might be assumed that these offenders must have adverted to these risks, some offenders delude themselves that they have more
control over events than they do.107 Sometimes we hold people responsible
not just for harm they do expect but also for harm they should expect.108 To
be sure, jurors may find recklessness in these cases, and requiring them to do
so reduces the risk that biases, whether racial prejudice or hindsight bias, will
induce them to overattribute negligence. Nevertheless, assuming negligence
merits blame, killing negligently in furtherance of a felony combines two
kinds of culpability, corresponding to two different harms. Together, these
may merit more punishment than negligent killing alone.
This rationale fits some features of felony murder doctrine: it often requires that we condition felony murder liability on both foreseeability of
death and a felonious purpose independent of injury to a person. This
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rationale also aligns with some evidence of popular intuitions about the punishment deserved for actual killers in the course of felonies. Paul Robinson
and John Darley found mock jurors willing to impose sentences of over 20
years for negligent homicide committed in the perpetration of a robbery,
while imposing sentences of only a year or two for negligent homicide outside of that context. Yet subjects supported much less severe sentences years
for accomplices in a fatal robbery who did not personally kill, and almost no
punishment, when the victim was a co-felon and the shooter was a resisting
victim.109
Of course, readers may agree that a negligently fatal robbery, arson, or
rape is substantively culpable and a grave crime, and still feel that “murder”
mislabels it. In addition, criminal liability is not only a question of labels.
Our judgments about deserved blame are traduced by the unusually severe
punishments our system attaches to such labels, as measured by international
standards.110 Further attenuating the link between criminal conviction and deserved blame is the prevalence of plea bargaining in this context of penal
severity. Offense definitions may little matter in this context, and unproven
convictions may communicate little about what offenders actually did.111
Nevertheless, the cases considered here, killings by police and killings during
crime, are not run of the mill. They attract public attention and affect our
sense of civic status and security. It matters to us how the legal system evaluates these actions, in our name.
One reason to carefully measure the normative considerations in favor
of felony murder liability is to assess dilemmas like those posed by felony
murder prosecutions of police. Understanding the normative valence of a felony murder conviction illuminates its expressive implications. Can such a
conviction ever express what is wrong with unjustified police killing? A second reason is to prioritize incremental reforms. What limits on felony murder
are most important to its opponents? What limits can its supporters accept?
That felony murder liability is defensible—if at all—as deserved rather than
expedient has implications for its scope. If we persuade ourselves that felony
murder liability can control crime by punishing excessively, or without proof
of guilt, we will be tempted to expand it indefinitely. But if we believe it can
only be justified when applied to conduct proven obviously dangerous to life
and malignly motivated, felony murder may be narrower and less liable to
abuse. Proving that a particular death is that exceptional case will be more
difficult. Further, if only desert can justify felony murder liability, penalties
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must also be proportional to culpability. The less felony murder charges grant
prosecutors unchecked power, the less politically invested they may be in its
preservation. In this way, reforms that confine felony murder liability to its
most justifiable applications may also advance the goal of ultimately abolishing it.
Public interest in reforming felony murder law has grown in recent years,
with publicity focusing especially on murder convictions of those who did
not personally kill. Thus the focus of the reformist movement has been on
liability for killings by accomplices, or by law enforcement, or others resisting the felony.112 As concern about mass incarceration has focused attention
on severe sentences, felony murder sentencing has come under scrutiny. Felony murder is graded as first degree murder or is punishable with Life Without Parole in many states.113
Several states have recently implemented reforms. Massachusetts abandoned felony murder in the 2017 case of Commonwealth v. Timothy
Brown.114 California's SB 1437 eliminated accomplice liability for felony
murder in 2018.115 Maryland courts adopted a merger rule in the 2017 case
of State v. Tyshon Jones.116 In 2021, Colorado adopted SB 124-2021, reducing felony murder penalties from life to a term of years, broadening an affirmative defense for unarmed accomplices of the killer, and adopting an
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agency rule.117 Also in 2021, Illinois—which originated the practice of punishing felons for killings by non-parties—adopted an agency rule as part of a
massive criminal justice reform bill, HB 3653 also known as the Safe-T
Act.118 Since passage of this bill, the Illinois governor has begun reviewing
cases of those previously convicted of felony murder for police killings, and
issuing pardons.119
Ultimately, clarity on the normative meaning of felony murder may not
settle the tension between abolitionist and reformist impulses. But in delineating the justificatory limits of the doctrine, we can both shape the most acceptable felony murder rule and highlight what remains morally unsatisfying,
even where felony murder convictions are most justifiable. In seeing how
felony murder fails to adequately condemn, and sometimes exonerates, racist
policing, we expose its less acknowledged shortcomings and perhaps illuminate a path to doctrinal abolition.
III. FELONY MURDER PROSECUTION OF POLICE
Clarity about the normative implications of felony murder highlights its
appeal as a tool to punish police killings such as those committed by Derek
Chauvin and Garrett Rolfe. But on closer inspection the doctrine’s potential
for denouncing or deterring brutal policing is quite limited.
Chauvin was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, three homicide
offenses under Minnesota law: third degree murder, defined as "caus[ing] the
death of another by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and
evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life," and punishable up
to 25 years;121 second degree murder, defined as "caus[ing] the death of a
human being . . . while committing or attempting to commit a felony,” and
punishable up to 25 years;122 and second degree manslaughter, defined as
causing death negligently. The predicate felony for Chauvin's felony murder
charge was assault in the third degree, requiring "assault[ing] another and
inflict[ing] substantial bodily harm."123
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The third degree murder charge was initially dismissed by the trial judge,
who read the statute as requiring that a depraved indifference murder endanger multiple victims.124 It was restored after the Minnesota Court of Appeals
upheld the third degree murder conviction in the State v. Noor.125 As noted
earlier, however, the Court of Appeals decision, and Noor's third degree murder conviction, were later overturned by the Minnesota Supreme Court.126
This very likely implies that Chauvin's third degree murder conviction is no
longer valid.
One effect of this decision is that Chauvin will be punished and condemned much more severely than Noor. The reversal of Noor’s Third degree
Murder conviction leaves him liable only for second degree manslaughter,
which requires causing death by “culpable negligence” by “consciously” creating a risk of death or great bodily harm.127 Noor’s sentence was reduced
from 12.5 to 4.75 years.128 Obviously, some disparity may be appropriate:
unlike Chauvin, Noor was responding to a call about a violent crime, he saw
his partner draw his gun and his fatal mistake was a momentary impulse, not
a choice defiantly maintained for nine minutes.
In overturning Noor’s depraved indifference murder conviction, the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed to extensive Minnesota precedent restricting
that crime to deaths resulting from acts endangering more than one person.129
The state urged the court to overrule this precedent on the basis of a structural
interpretation of the code: restricting depraved indifference murder to reckless acts endangering multiple victims left a gap, as the code had no other
offense encompassing killing with reckless indifference toward an individual.
The court responded that such conduct is encompassed by second degree
murder—felony murder—when predicated on assault.130
However, this crime—the very crime Chauvin was convicted of—does
not require proof of recklessness towards death.131 Moreover, because
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Minnesota lacks a merger limitation, its felony murder rule does not require
any aggravating motive for imposing such risk. As noted above, the selective
imposition of a risk of death on a single victim can be more depraved if the
principle of selection is an illegitimate one such as racial identity, political
dissent, or resistance to subordination. The Noor decision may accord with
precedent, but that precedent is not compelled by the statutory language, and
it does leave a gap in the law. The court filled this gap with a broader felony
murder offense uncabined by a merger limitation. The result left prosecutors
free to charge fatal assaults as manslaughters or murders without requiring
any difference in proof.
Minnesota is not unique in lacking murder liability for killing with depraved indifference directed at an individual. Seven states appear not to permit murder based on recklessness (outside the context of a felony).132 Four
states join Minnesota in conditioning murder offenses on recklessness only if
directed toward multiple potential victims,133 although one also punishes killing with recklessness towards an individual as murder.134 Thus, in 38 states,
murder would potentially be available for any reckless and unjustified police
killing. Felony murder is unnecessary as a prosecutorial tool for punishing
most unjustified police violence in those states.
As it happened, Chauvin was, and Noor was not, charged with second
degree (felony) murder. Although convicted of both second and third degree
murder. Chauvin was sentenced only for the higher charge, receiving 22 ½
years in prison.135 Two of the factors used to justify increasing Chauvin's
sentence above a 15-year guideline recommendation for second degree murder sentence were his "abuse of a position of trust and authority,"136 and his
"particular cruelty" toward the victim.137 In finding abuse of authority, the
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judge pointed out Chauvin’s reckless indifference to human life in these
terms:
Defendant . . . held a handcuffed George Floyd . . . for an inordinate
length of time (more than nine minutes and forty seconds), [in] a position that Defendant knew from his training and experience carried
with it a danger of positional asphyxia. The prolonged use of this technique was particularly egregious in that George Floyd made it clear
he was unable to breathe and expressed the view that he was dying as
a result of the officers’ restraint . . . . In addition, the other officers
involved in the restraint . . . twice inquired during the restraint if they
should roll Floyd onto his side, i.e., into a “recovery position” and
[one] later also informed Defendant that he believed Floyd had passed
out. Thus, not only was the danger of asphyxia theoretical, it was
communicated to the Defendant as actually occurring with George
Floyd.138
The court’s finding of abuse of authority also relied on such facts as his
violation of his training, his failure to render aid, and his using force far in
excess of what was necessary to maintain custody.139 The judge’s finding of
cruelty detailed further culpability:
b. It was particularly cruel to kill George Floyd slowly by preventing
his ability to breathe when Mr. Floyd had already indicated he was
having trouble breathing. c. The slow death of George Floyd, occurring over approximately six minutes of his positional asphyxia was
particularly cruel in that Mr. Floyd was begging for his life and was
obviously terrified by the knowledge he was likely to die but during
which the defendant objectively remained indifferent to Mr. Floyd’s
pleas. . . . the prolonged nature of the asphyxiation was by itself particularly cruel.140
These official statements, measured, grave but painfully graphic and patiently detailed, from an exponent of the legal system, do describe and denounce Chauvin’s actions in appropriate terms. They contributed to making
the trial, conviction and sentencing the moving and cathartic event that it was.
Nevertheless. As discretionary sentencing factors, these facts did not
have to be charged, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or found by a jury.141
138
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They were not integral elements of the offense of conviction. To be sure, the
jury necessarily found Chauvin’s conduct "dangerous" and "depraved" in
convicting him of third degree murder, but the felony murder charge for
which he was actually sentenced did not require this. The jury had to find that
Chauvin’s use of force was not justified to find him guilty of assault but did
not have to additionally find that he abused his office. Under Minnesota’s
statute, Chauvin could have been convicted of exactly the same charge if he
had thrown a punch in response to a suspect’s curse and the suspect had improbably suffered a fatal head injury.
Minnesota is unusual (although not unique) in permitting felonious assault as a predicate for felony murder.142 It neither enumerates predicate felonies, nor limits predicate felonies by means of a merger rule. Rather than
two dimensions of culpability (towards physical harm and an independent
felonious purpose), felony murder predicated on assault has only one. The
reader might assume that at least the culpability towards physical harm required for felony assault must be very high, since that crime requires inflicting substantial physical injury. Surely the intent to inflict such injury would
imply consciously imposing a risk of death. Yet in Minnesota, third degree
assault does not require intent—or, for that matter any culpable mental
state—with respect to the injury. In the case of State v. Gorman, for example,
defendant was convicted of felony murder for a single, fatal blow with a
fist.143 Thus, while Chauvin's presumptively invalid third degree murder conviction implied that he acted with both reckless indifference to human life
and a depraved motive, Chauvin's legally valid felony murder conviction required no finding of any culpability beyond the bare foreseeability of death.
Such a charge gives the jury no responsibility—and no real opportunity—to
judge the defendant's moral guilt. At the close of his summation, prosecutor
Jerry Blackwell famously concluded that while the defense had argued that
"Mr. Floyd died because his heart was too big... the truth of the matter is that
the reason George Floyd is dead is because Mr. Chauvin's heart is too
small."144 Yet, the felony murder charge neither required nor permitted any
such finding.
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The abuse of public authority found by the judge at Chauvin's sentencing
represents culpability toward a secondary harm. While the jury did not learn
this, Chauvin had earlier used the same tactic, kneeling for 17 minutes on the
neck of a bleeding 14-year-old, who also complained that he could not
breathe, while his mother protested.145 Chauvin’s misuse of public authority
to inflict unnecessary pain, fear, and risk bespeaks an attitude of contempt for
the governed, and disregard of public responsibilities, as well as indifference
to human life. Does Minnesota have an official misconduct or civil rights
felony that could have better served as a predicate felony? No. It has an official misconduct offense of unlawfully injuring another in his person or rights,
but it is only a misdemeanor.146 Well then, an assailant’s animus or selective
disregard toward a particular group, could add further culpability toward a
secondary harm. Does Minnesota have a hate crime felony? Minnesota imposes a sentence enhancement for some hate-motivated crimes but imposes
felony liability only for a second hate-motivated assault conviction.147
In Minnesota, if reckless killers cannot be charged with depraved indifference murder as a result of endangering a single victim, felony murder predicated on assault is the only unintentional murder charge available to Minnesota prosecutors in such a case. This puts critics of felony murder and critics
of police violence in the dilemma with which we began. The felony murder
law which enabled Chauvin’s murder conviction—lacking any merger limitation—is one of the broadest and least defensible.
Officer Garrett Rolfe was charged with “felony murder”,148 defined as “in
the commission of a felony, caus[ing] the death of another human being irrespective of malice.”149 Like Minnesota, Georgia lacks a merger limitation, so
that assault can serve as a predicate felony there. Apart from murder, the felonies thus far charged in the Rolfe case are of two kinds: willful and intentional violation of oath by a public officer (by shooting Brooks twice in the
back, and failing to render medical aid),150 and aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (committed against Brooks and bystanders in the parking
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lot).151 Thus far, felony murder charges have been predicated only on the aggravated assault offenses.152
On these facts, a high degree of culpability towards death—recklessness—is implicit in the weapon Rolfe used. But the offense definition treats
as a deadly weapon any weapon actually causing a serious injury, without
requiring any culpability towards that result. As a result, in Georgia, as in
Minnesota, an assailant can be convicted of felony murder for a single fatal
blow with a bare hand.153 Thus, the felony murder charge predicated on assault does not require proof of the culpability towards death Rolfe demonstrated and does not require culpability towards any secondary harm. When
we turn to the official misconduct felony, a possible basis for additional felony murder counts, we find that its elements do not inherently entail culpability towards death. However, the offense does entail an abuse of public
trust. This provides culpability towards a secondary wrong and in that respect
partially justifies the severe condemnation of a murder conviction. Georgia
has now passed a bill imposing modest hate crime penalty enhancements, but
did so only in the wake of the Ahmaud Arbery and Brooks killings.154
Could this case have been resolved by charging depraved indifference
murder requiring recklessness as an offense element? Unlike Minnesota,
Georgia has a depraved indifference murder offense that can apply to endangerment of an individual.155 So why wasn’t Brooks charged with that form of
murder? A possible reason is that Georgia’s depraved indifference murder
offense has an exception for provoked killings.156 Brooks’ alleged taser attack
on Rolfe might constitute such provocation, even though it would not justify
Rolfe’s killing of Brooks. Given this difficulty, the felony murder charge
eases the prosecution’s path to conviction and may avoid some risk of juror
confusion. One option absent in Georgia is a manslaughter felony conditioned on recklessness or negligence toward death and not predicated on another offense.157 Thus, in cases of unintended killing, prosecutors in Georgia
face a dilemma. Murder is their only charging option involving any significant punishment. The legislature has helped prosecutors, not by enacting an
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GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-21(2) (2022) (defining a deadly weapon as "any object, device, or instrument, which when used offensively against a person is likely to, or actually does result in serious
bodily injury).; Nicole Chavez, What We Know ABout the Charges Against the Officers Invovled in
Rayshard Brooks’ Death, CNN (June 17, 2020, 9:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/17/us/rayshard-brooks-officers-charges/index.html [perma.cc/DE3E-4RPL].
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Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788, 793, 798 (Ga. 2002).
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Angela Barajas, Dianne Gallagher & Erica Henry, Georga Governor Signs Hate Crime Bill
SPurred by Outrage over Ahmaud Arbery’s Killing, CNN (June 26, 2020, 3:07 PM),
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involuntary manslaughter offense, but by rejecting a merger limitation on felony murder. Again, because Georgia's felony murder law is one of the broadest and least defensible,158 the felony murder prosecution of Garrett Rolfe
poses a dilemma for progressives bent on reforming both policing and felony
murder law.
We have seen that Minnesota and Georgia can prosecute police for felony
murder, predicated on aggravated assault, because they (1) do not exhaustively enumerate felonies and (2) lack a merger rule. In addition, Georgia has
a felony of official misconduct that can provide a predicate for felony murder.
Six other states enumerate some form of aggravated assault as a predicate
felony. Aggravated assault, where the victim of the assault is killed, can serve
as a predicate felony in Montana, Ohio, Washington and Wisconsin.160 In
Washington, the victim cannot be a co-felon.161 In Louisiana, a narrow form
of assault entailing recklessness, drive-by-shooting, is an enumerated predicate felony.162 In Illinois, felony murder can be predicated on assault, but not
if the victim was the intended target.163 Three other states, Texas, Missouri
and Delaware, impose felony murder predicated on non-enumerated felonies
and have rejected a merger rule.164 Thus, in only seven other states could an
officer face felony murder liability for an unjustified fatal assault of a civilian.
In only one state other than Georgia is it possible to punish killing in the
course of an official misconduct, civil rights violation or hate crime felony as
murder. Illinois has an official misconduct felony, which includes performance by an official of any act he is forbidden by law to perform.165 If such
a felony is performed, while contemplating that violence might be necessary
to carry out the offense, it qualifies as a "forcible felony" that can be a predicate for felony murder.166
This summary returns us to our question. Should other states change their
laws to enable felony murder prosecution of police who kill unreasonably, as
in Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Washington,
158

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (2022).
MONT. CODE ANN. 45-5-102(1)(b) (2021) ("assault with a weapon" and "aggravated assault");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2903.02(B), 2903.11(D)(1)(a) (2022) ("felonious assault"); State v. Owens, 166
N.E.3d 1142, 1146 (Ohio 2020) cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2577 (2021) (rejects merger doctrine); WASH.
REV. CODE 9A.32.050 (1)(b) (2022) ("including assault"); WIS. STAT. 940.03, 940.19 (2022) ("battery"). For purposes of this discussion, we do not distinguish between offenses labelled “assault” and
those labelled “battery,” on the assumption that any homicide will satisfy the definition of either.
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WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.32.050 (1)(b) (2022).
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LA. STAT. ANN. 14:30.1(2) (2022).
163
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (2022); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2022); People v. Morgan, 758
N.E.2.d 813, 838 (Ill. 2001); People v. Boyd, 825 N.E.2d 364, 369–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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Lawson v. Texas, 64 S.W.3d 396, 396–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d
254, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§635,636 (2022); see also Binder, supra note 12, at 540 (explaining this statute as
removing a requirement of causing death "in furtherance of the felony" to invalidate decisions basing
a merger doctrine on this language).
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720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33-3 (official misconduct).
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and Wisconsin (and in rare cases, Louisiana)? Recall that the merger doctrine
serves an important purpose: requiring an additional dimension of culpability
for felony murder beyond negligently risking death and doing so for a gravely
wrong purpose independent of that danger. If we are going to have felony
murder, it should be bounded by a merger rule. Making it easier to prosecute
police is not a sufficient reason to predicate felony murder on felonious assault.
On the other hand, predicating felony murder on a felony of civil rights
violation or misuse of public authority would add an independent wrongful
purpose to the negligent imposition of risk. This would comply with the merger doctrine and so it is a better way to expand felony murder liability to
encompass unreasonable police violence. States lacking a civil rights or official misconduct felony arguably should add one whether or not they designate
it as a predicate for felony murder. Adding such a felony is of value in denouncing and deterring police violence regardless of whether it can be used
as a predicate for felony murder. Finally, a hate crime is another kind of felony that could add a felonious purpose independent of physical harm. Yet
proving a discriminatory purpose for a particular act of police violence is also
notoriously difficult.167 Many instances of police violence may reflect what
one of the authors has called reckless racism.168 Nationally, hate crime
charges and enhancements are little used by prosecutors, when other charges
are available, as they almost always are. Not only hard to prove, bias allegations rarely affect penalties, and may provoke juror pushback.169
But supposing a state had a civil rights or hate crime felony, there would
still be an objection to charging police with felony murder. Indeed, Georgia
could charge Garrett Rolfe with murder predicated on official misconduct
felony, but there would still be something unsatisfying about this charge. It
would understate the highly culpable attitude toward the risk of death Rolfe
displayed. The killings of Floyd and Brooks were not merely careless. They
were at least reckless toward the lives of their victims, a morally significant
fact that felony murder liability does not reflect. Punishing Chauvin and Rolfe
for felony murder may be the best among bad alternatives, but charges of
depraved indifference would better characterizes their culpability. Fortunately, such charges will be available to prosecute unjustified police killings
in most states.
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IV. FELONY MURDER PROSECUTION OF FELONS FOR KILLINGS BY POLICE
Thus far, we have examined the possibilities of using felony murder laws
to punish unreasonable police killings. Here, we turn to another use of felony
murder liability in cases of police violence: prosecuting not the police who
kill, but the suspects they target or pursue. In many cases, the dead victims
are co-felons. And sometimes the felons who survive to be charged are also
injured victims.
Jurisdictions divide on permitting such prosecutions. A majority preclude
felony murder liability for the actions of police in opposition to the felony,
by imposing an "agency rule"—limiting felony murder liability to deaths directly caused by a participant in the felony.170 But a substantial minority instead punish felons for any deaths "proximately caused" by the felony—including those caused by police or others in resisting the felony.
Although in force in most states, agency rules have heretofore lacked a
principled rationale. The most influential argument in their favor, offered by
Dean Norval Morris in 1956, invoked precedent, and the general disrepute of
felony murder liability itself.171 Probably Morris and many of his readers presumed that the Model Penal Code would soon rationalize homicide law and
consign the anachronism of felony murder to the dustbin of history. His arguments were initially effective and proximate cause standards almost disappeared. Yet they ultimately proved helpless to prevent a legislatively led expansion of felony murder liability during the war on crime. Proximate cause
standards were based on an expansive modern conception of causation championed by the Model Penal Code itself. The new codes inspired by the Model
Penal Code were passed during the War on Crime, not by liberal reformers,
170
People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134-35 (Cal. 1965); State v. Young, 469 A.2d 1189, 1193
(Conn. 1983) (favorably citing New York agency rule decision of People v. Wood, 137 A.2d 472 (NY
1958) discussed infra at note 236); Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 337 (Del. 2009); State v. Pina, 233
P.3d 71, 78 (Idaho 2010); State v. Sophophone, 19 P.3d 70, 77 (Kan. 2001); State v. Bryant, 78 P.3d
462, 466 (Kan. 2003); State v. Small, 100 So.3d 797, 806 (La. 2012) Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034,
1042 (Md. 1982); State v. Branson, 487 N.W. 2d 880, 885 (Minn. 1992); State v. Rust, 250 N.W.2d
867, 875 (Neb. 1977); Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P. 2d 766, 768 (Nev. 1973); State v. Bonner, 411 S.E.2d
598, 603-04 (N.C. 598); State v. Williams, 185 N.C. App. 318, 332 (2007); Commonwealth ex rel.
Smith & Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 559-60 (Pa. 1970); State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tenn. Crim.
App.1988); State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d
811, 816 (Va. 1981); State v. Bauer, 329 P.3d 67, 73 (Wash. 2014) (“no Washington case upholding
… liability, where the accuse did not actively participate in the immediate physical impetus of harm.”);
Davis v. Fox, 735 S.E.2d 259, 265 (W. Va. 2012).For statutes appearing to require causation of death
by a participant, see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-54c; Iowa Code Ann. § 707.2; La Stat Ann
14:30.1(A)(2).; Me. Rev. Stat. T. 17-A § 202 I.1.;Minnesota Statutes 609.19 Subd. 2 (1); Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-3-19 I.(1)(c); Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-102 I.(1)(b) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-303 ; O.R.S. §
163.115(b); R.I. Gen. Laws. Ann. § 11-23-1; S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-4; Tenn. Code Ann. § 3913-202 I(a)(2); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2)(d); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 9A.32.030(1)(c); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 6-2-101(I)(a). For a jury instruction requiring causation by a participant, see SJCI §2-3 (South
Carolina).
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Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
50, 60-68 (1956).
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but by legislators eager to show they were tough on crime. Most new codes
retained felony murder. New proximate cause standards drew authority from
these new codes in many states.
A. "Chain Reaction": Proximate Cause as a Defensive Weapon
The restriction of felony murder liability to killings in furtherance of the
felony is found in the earliest formulation of the rule. In Rex v. Plummer,172
one smuggler shot another, while in flight from royal officers. Justice Holt
supported extending murder liability to accomplices in any “deliberate” and
“malicious” predicate felony “tend[ing] to the hurt of another either immediately or by necessary consequence,” provided that “the killing must be in pursuance of that unlawful act, and not collateral to it.”173 However, since there
was no proof that the shooting had anything to do with the smuggling crime,
the accomplices of the shooter could not be guilty of murder.
A review of reported felony murder cases in nineteenth century America
disclosed none where liability was imposed for a death directly caused by an
intervening actor (such as a police officer), not party to the felony.174 In the
1863 Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Campbell,175 the defendant
was a participant in a riot, during which a bystander was fatally shot, possibly
by a soldier attempting to disperse the crowd.176 The court held that "[n]o
person can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually or constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by
his own hand or by someone acting in concert with him or in furtherance of
a common object or purpose."177 The 1888 Illinois case of Butler v. People,178
repeated this language in overturning manslaughter convictions for defendants who resisted arrest for a minor disturbance, and whose arresting officer
fatally shot their uninvolved brother.179 The court added that "[w]here the
criminal liability arises from the act of another, it must appear that the act
was done in furtherance of the common design . . . ; otherwise a person might
be convicted of a crime to the commission of which he never assisted, which
could not be done upon any principle of justice."180 This pattern continued in
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84 Eng. Rep 1103, (K.B. 1701).
Id. at 1105–07.
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Binder, Origins of American Felony Murder, supra note 13, at 193–96. The nearest exception
occurred in 1900: the shield case of Keaton v. State, forcing the victim into gunfire. 57 S.W. 1125,
1129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900).
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7 Allen 541, 542 (Mass. 1863).
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Id. at 542.
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Id. at 544 .
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the early twentieth century: a 1905 Kentucky case, Commonwealth v.
Moore181 reasoned that "[i]n order that one may be guilty of homicide, the
act must be done by him actually or constructively, and that cannot be, unless
the crime be committed by his own hand, or by the hands of someone acting
in concert with him, or in furtherance of a common object or purpose."182
These courts presumed the principle prevailing in nineteenth century criminal
law, that one actor could not be the cause of another's action.183
Yet by the early twentieth century, several lines of cases had eroded this
principle. Some cases imposed causal responsibility on assailants for the dangerous flight,184 or even suicide,185 of victims. Others imposed liability for
death mediated by another's neglect or unwise treatment of an injury.186 Some
imposed causal responsibility on arsonists when firefighters or inhabitants
entered a blaze, even if imprudently.187 Several decisions brushed aside as
irrelevant, robbers' doubtful claims that their guns were discharged by struggling victims.188 In one, the 1925 case of People v. Krauser, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished Butler:
The shooting of Souders was a consequence naturally to be
expected from the plaintiff in error's acts. He made an assault
with a deadly weapon, and Souders was justified in resisting
the attack... . It is not material whether it was in the hand of
the plaintiff in error or Souders. The plaintiff in error had the
intent to commit murder if resisted.189
Additional cases upheld liability where felons had coerced victims to
serve as shields and so exposed them to anticipated gunfire.190 While a voluntary act could supersede the felony as a cause of death, a coerced act was
neither voluntary nor independent of the felony.
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88 S.W. 1085 (Ky. 1905).
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By the middle third of the twentieth century, then, courts had identified
several ways that felons might become causally responsible for the destructive act of a non-felon. It became plausible to see defensive force against a
felony, and even force used in arresting felons, as coerced by the felony. In
the 1935 case of People v. Payne,191 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld a
murder conviction for the fatal shooting of a robbery victim in an exchange
of gunfire between a robber and the victim's brother, where the source of the
fatal bullet was uncertain.192 Citing Krauser, the court held "[i]t reasonably
might be anticipated that an attempted robbery would meet with resistance,
during which the victim might be shot either by himself or someone else in
attempting to prevent the robbery, and those attempting to perpetrate the robbery would be guilty of murder."193 In the 1952 Texas case, of Miers v.
State,194 a defendant appealed his conviction on the basis of the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury to acquit him if his robbery victim had accidentally
shot himself.195 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the felony murder conviction, reasoning that the defendant caused the victim's act by menacing him.196
This expansion of liability was not motivated merely by abstract theoretical debates about the reach of proximate cause. Rather, deaths caused by
victims and police were recast as defensive responses compelled by enemy
outsiders. Most influential were a pair of postwar Pennsylvania cases likening
felonies to sedition and aggression, and portraying police as soldiers, immunized by duty. In the 1947 case of Commonwealth v. Moyer,197 where the defense alleged that one robbery victim shot another while exchanging gunfire
with the robbers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld an instruction that
"[a]ll of the participants in an attempted robbery are guilty of murder in the
first degree if someone is killed in the course of" that crime.198 It invoked the
recent war:
It is the right and duty of both individuals and nations to meet criminal
aggression with effective countermeasures. Every robber or burglar
knows when he attempts to commit his crime that he is inviting dangerous resistance. ... For Earl Shank, the proprietor of a gas station
…being attacked by armed robbers, to return the fire of these robbers
with a pistol which he had at hand was as proper and as inevitable as
it was for the American forces at Pearl Harbor on the morning of
191

194 N.E. 539 (Ill. 1935).
Id. at 543–44.
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Id. at 255.
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53 A.2d 736, 740, (Pa. 1947)
198
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December 7, 1941, to return the fire of the Japanese invaders. The
Japanese felonious invasion of the Hawaiian Islands on that date was
in law and morals the proximate cause of all the resultant fatalities. The Moyer-Byron felonious invasion of the Shank gas station on
July 13, 1946, was likewise the proximate cause of the resultant fatality.199
The Moyer court next cited the Haymarket Riot, or “Anarchists’ Case”,
convicting organizers of a labor demonstration for killing a police officer
when a bomb was thrown by an unidentified person, never linked to the defendants.200 The explosion was followed by police gunfire killing several
members of the crowd.201 Finally, the Moyer court cited a Civil War case
finding that "the proximate cause of the fire [set by the Union army] which
destroyed plaintiff's property was the rebel invasion."202
Moyer was followed in 1949 by Commonwealth v. Almeida,203 in which
an off-duty police officer was killed in a super-market parking lot in front of
his family, during an exchange of fire between police and robbers fleeing the
store after a hold-up.204 Almeida contended that another officer had fired the
fatal shot, but the Court upheld instructions that the defendants would be liable for shots fired in resisting the robbery.205 The court reprised much of its
argument in the Moyer case, reasoning that "he whose felonious act is the
proximate cause of another's death is criminally responsible for that
death.”206 Again, the court favorably invoked the Anarchists’ Case.207 The
court asserted the involuntariness of police use of force: "The policemen cannot be charged with any wrongdoing because their participation in the exchange of bullets with the bandits was both in justifiable self-defense and in
the performance of their duty."208
It is not surprising to see repeated references to causal chains in an opinion affirming proximate causation—but one of these revealingly involved a
novel nuclear metaphor: "a knave who feloniously and maliciously starts 'a
chain reaction' of acts dangerous to life must be held responsible for the natural fatal results . . . ."209 This trope of Hiroshima as both compelled and
199

Id. at 741–42.
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(1970).
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Id. at 602.
208
Id. at 607.
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justified by Pearl Harbor was common in postwar America. Historian Paul
Boyer recounts:
A Chicago Tribune cartoon of August 8 [1945] pictured a long fuse
running from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima over which flies debris and
various body fragments including a severed head murmuring "So
sorry." . . . William L. Laurence struck the same note in Dawn Over
Zero (1946) as he described his feelings while flying toward Nagasaki: "Does one feel any pity or compassion for the poor devils about
to die? Not when one thinks of Pearl Harbor and of the Death March
on Bataan."210
Yet America's unprecedented use of nuclear weapons late in the war was,
like the court's unprecedented extension of felony murder, novel and of questionable legitimacy.211 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would abandon proximate cause in 1958, a dissent would continue to defend it in authoritarian terms: "The brutal crime wave ...sweeping and appalling our country
can be halted only if the courts stop coddling... and freeing murderers, communists and criminals on technicalities made of straw."212
Several other states adopted the proximate cause standard of Almeida and
Moyer. In the 1952 case People v. Podolski, the Michigan Supreme Court
upheld defendant's first-degree felony murder conviction for his participation
in a bank robbery in which one police officer was fatally shot by another.213
The court quoted Moyer on the need to "return the fire of the Japanese invaders."214 In a 1955 Florida case, the defendant and an accomplice fled a
robbery by taking hostages and firing at police.215 The defendant's

in 1946 (of which 57 referenced a nuclear chain reaction); seven of 23 references from 1947 through
1949 were metaphoric). https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ The concept of a nuclear "chain reaction" was developed by Leo Szilard and included in a 1934 patent application granted in 1936. Improvements in or relating to the transmutation of chemical elements, U.K. Patent No. GB630726A
(filed June 28, 1934, (issued March 30, 1936) (UK).
210
Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light 185 (1994).
211
Opinion polls in 1945 revealed Americans overwhelmingly supported use of the bomb immediately thereafter, although a small minority thought it should have first been demonstrated in an unpopulated area. Id. at 183–84. Influential considerations were the belief that use had saved American
lives and that aerial bombardment of population centers had become routine during the war. Id. at 185–
86, 189. By 1949, the cold war context induced most Americans to oppose an American pledge to avoid
first use. Id. at 336. See also MARGOT HENRIKSEN, DR. STRANGELOVE'S AMERICA: SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE ATOMIC AGE 8 (1997) (dependence of American security on nuclear weapons consolidated
approval of them). For Szilard's droll reflections on the legality of the nuclear weapons he helped develop, see generally L. Szilard, My Trial as a War Criminal, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 79 (1949). For a later
inconclusive view, see 1996 I.C.J. 11 (deciding by a vote of 7-7 with the President breaking the tie,
that use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to humanitarian law, but might be justifiable in selfdefense).
212
Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 483 (Pa. 1958) (Bell, J., dissenting).
213
52 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Mich. 1952).
214
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accomplice was killed by police, and an officer was killed by an unknown
shooter. Citing Almeida, the court held that the source of the shot was immaterial as "the proximate cause of the killing was the malicious criminal action
of the felons."216 In the 1963 Oklahoma case if Johnson v. State,217 the shot
killing a police officer during a burglary might have come from his partner.218
The jury was told to convict the burglar if he “set in motion a chain of events
which were or should have been within his contemplation.”219 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, citing Podolski.220 An influential student
comment defended Pennsylvania's new “proximate cause” test and rejected
the traditional test limiting liability to acts in furtherance of a common plan,
as a misapplication of “agency” principles, that improperly dignified criminal conspiracies as fiduciary relationships.221 This gave the traditional
“agency rule” its modern name.222
B. The Triumph of Morris's Doctrinal Defense of Agency
The proximate cause test was poorly received among academics. Norval
Morris’s 1956 article, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others
became the authoritative critique. Morris identified the proximate cause test
as a novel extension of felony murder liability. Morris reasoned that a felony
murder rule defines the mens rea of murder, and so should not affect causation, an actus reus concept. He interpreted American statutory felony murder
rules as incorporating common law doctrine and denied the Pennsylvania
court's claim that “any person committing any common law felony . . . is from
time immemorial responsible for the natural and reasonably foreseeable results of his felony.”223 An absence of older precedents imposing liability for
defensive killings implied that such liability was not incorporated by reference in statutes punishing murder generally, or felony murder in particular.
Morris proceeded to distinguish the twentieth century cases expanding causation, arguing that, properly understood, the shield cases and dangerous
flight cases were cases where the death was directly caused by the defendant.224
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Absent statutory compulsion or long-settled precedent, judicial application of a proximate cause standard was discretionary, and so could only be
justified by policy considerations.225 “Deterrence,” he reasoned, “must be the
main purpose; it is the purpose expressed by the majority in Almeida and
Thomas.”226 Morris then considered the deterrent value of such liability and
invoked the punishment lottery argument against felony murder liability,
quoting the classic reasoning by the English Criminal Law Commission.227
The only reform of felony murder that could be justified by policy was to
abolish it.
Morris's arguments had an immediate impact. In the 1958 case of Commonwealth v. Redline,228 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned a
felon's murder conviction, for the killing of a co-felon by a police officer,
thereby overruling Thomas and repudiating the reasoning of Almeida.229 The
Court acknowledged that these cases had “provoked a large amount of critical
law review comment” and singled out Morris's piece as "a particularly wellconsidered and cogent criticism."230 It reasoned that it was not the place of
the judiciary to expand the scope of criminal liability, invoked Campbell,
Butler and Moore, and distinguishing the same cases that Morris had,231argued that Almeida and Thomas had deviated from precedent.232 While overruling only Thomas's imposition of felony murder liability for non-party killings of co-felons, the court threatened to overrule Almeida, a shoe it proceeded to drop in the 1970 case of Commonwealth ex rel Smith & Myers.233
There, the court again cited Morris,234 called felony murder “'a hold-over
from the days of our barbarian Anglo-Saxon ancestors',” 235 doubted that felony murder “has the deterrent effect its proponents assert,"236 and concluded
that "[w]ith so weak a foundation, it behooves us not to extend it further."237
Morris's arguments triumphed in eight other states. The 1960 New York
decision in People v. Wood238 dismissed a felony murder charge for the fatal
shootings of a bystander and co-felon by a third party resisting the felony.239
The court invoked Campbell, Butler, Moore and Redline,240 reasoned that the
225

Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 67.
227
Id. at 68; Comm’rs on Crim. L., Second Report 17 (1846).
228
137 A.2d 472, (Pa. 1958).
229
Id. at 482–83.
230
Id. at 473 n.1.
231
Id. at 499–501.
232
Id. at 482–82.
233
261 A.2d 550, 559–60 (Pa. 1970).
234
Id.
235
Id. at 554 (quoting Addison Mueller, Criminal Law and its Administration, 34 N.YU. L. REV.
83, 98 (1959)).
236
Id. at 554.
237
Id. .
238
167 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1960).
239
Id. at 738.
240
Id. at 738-39.
226

2022]

Police Killings as Felony Murder

39

common law felony murder rule had been "barbaric[ally]" broad, and concluded the legislature must have intended to restrict it to killings by parties to
the felony.241 The 1963 Michigan decision in People v. Austin,242 adopted
Redline's reasoning243 and rejected Podolski’s.244
In the 1965 case of People v. Washington,245 the California Supreme
Court reversed the felony murder conviction of a robber for the killing of his
co-felon by a victim.246 While the court below had relied on Almeida, the
Supreme Court rejected felony murder for any victim killed by a non-party.247
Citing Morris,248 the court rejected deterrence of both the homicide and the
predicate felony as justifications for punishing felons for defensive killings,
concluding that felony murder was justifiable on the basis of neither utility
nor desert: "Although it is the law in this state . . . it should not be extended
beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve."249 However, the
court offered prosecutors another path to murder liability for “defendants who
initiate gun battles... if their victims resist and kill”: depraved indifference
murder,250 a path later taken in Taylor v. Superior Court.251
Also in 1965, the Massachusetts decision of Commonwealth v. Balliro252
awarded a new trial to a burglar who was denied an instruction conditioning
murder liability on the fatal shots having been fired by burglars rather than
police. The court cited Morris, the Campbell, Butler, and Moore cases on
which he relied, and the Wood, Washington, Redline and Austin cases that
cited him.253 In the 1970's similar reasoning was adopted and similar sources
cited in Nevada,254 Colorado,255 and New Jersey.256 Even in Illinois, an
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intermediate court decision cited Redline in reversing a conviction for the
death of a co-felon shot by a robbery victim, although on the narrow grounds
that the victim was a co-felon, shot justifiably.257 By the early 1970's, Morris’s arguments had triumphed everywhere and the proximate cause standard
seemed in full rout.
C. The Codification of Proximate Cause During the War on Crime
Yet like many progressive ideas that seemed intellectually inevitable
in 1970, the extinction of the proximate cause standard—and indeed of felony
murder itself—failed to materialize. American politics turned right and got
tough on crime.258 While it is tempting to describe this as a triumph of politics
over principle, Morris's argument was not about principle. If, as Morris implied, predicate felonies supply insufficient culpability to justify murder liability, felony murder liability will be unjustified whether or not causation is
direct. Morris did not argue as did others, that proximate cause rules too easily blamed felons for deaths that were ex ante improbable.259 Nor did he argue, as Anthony Amsterdam and George Fletcher later would, that objective
criteria of liability were preferable for civil libertarian reasons.260 This lack
of policy rationale left the agency rule vulnerable. In a society increasingly
engineering complex systems, and using economic and epidemiological modeling in policy, confining causation to direct contact was bound to seem
quaint.
Indeed, Morris probably expected his argument to have a limited shelf
life. He could justifiably assume in 1956 that if a future Model Penal Code
had any influence, it would be to eliminate felony murder legislatively.261 The
proposed Code would indeed effectively abolish felony murder by requiring
at least recklessness for murder.262 But of the 36 new state codes passed after
the drafting and circulation of the MPC's homicide provisions, only five states
formerly imposing felony murder liability abandoned it,263 and one state
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actually added felony murder.264 More influential was the Model Penal
Code's proximate cause approach to causation. In section 2.03, the Model
Penal Code defined a cause as conduct creating necessary conditions for results foreseeably risked. This definition was adopted by 14 different codes.265
Most of the new codes were passed in the 1970's and interpreted by later
appellate courts, by which time the War on Crime was well under way. In
many cases, new codes were adopted by the same legislators that reenacted
capital statutes in the wake of Furman v. Georgia.266 In any case, by superseding prior codes, the new codes obsoleted Morris's argument from precedent. Courts were free to construe these new felony murder provisions as
weapons in the War on Crime. And if they failed to, legislatures sometimes
corrected them with further revisions. Thus, ironically the Model Penal Code
only slightly reduced the prevalence of felony murder laws while expanding
the scope of causation of death, creating the conditions for a revival of proximate cause felony murder rules.
All Fifteen states that adopted proximate cause rules did so by either legislation or interpretation of new codes.
Seven did so legislatively. Five new codes explicitly permitted felony
murder liability for killings by non-parties.267 These included new codes recodifying felony murder in Arizona and Florida.268 Alaska’s new code
adopted felony murder for the first time, extending it to deaths caused by “any
person.”269 New codes in New Jersey and Colorado initially confined felony

CRIMINAL LAW 5–6 (5th ed. 2010) (listing 36 codes revised subsequent to MPC); see also Guyora
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murder to killings in furtherance of the felony.270 However, the New Jersey
and Colorado legislatures swiftly added language explicitly including killings
by non-parties, in response to court decisions recognizing agency rules.271
Missouri and Oklahoma legislated proximate cause standards outside the
context of codification. Missouri first adopted a proximate cause rule judicially in the precodification case of State v. Moore.272 In 1984, Missouri codified this rule through a provision imposing second degree murder liability
for attempting a felony in which "another person is killed as a result."273 Oklahoma did not adopt a new code, and long retained the proximate cause
standard adopted judicially in Johnson. However, the 1993 decision of State
v. Jones adopted an agency limit.274 In 1996, the legislature responded by
broadening liability to include "death . . . result[ing] from" a felony.275
The remaining eight states all adopted rules punishing felons for nonparty killing on the basis of statutory interpretation of new codes. Code interpretation was central in two decisions adopting proximate cause standards in
states where courts had earlier endorsed Morris’s approach.
Illinois recodified criminal law in 1962. In 1974, the Illinois Supreme
Court reasserted the vitality of Payne's proximate cause standard in People v.
Hickman,276 police staking out a warehouse, observing three men break in.
As they emerged, police arrested one, while two fled. One officer fired a
warning shot. A second officer, on observing an armed man crouching, yelled
"drop it." When the armed man—one of the seventeen officers at the scene—
failed to drop his weapon, the first officer killed him with a shotgun. The two
at large burglars were later apprehended at another location, unarmed. In affirming their felony murder convictions, the Illinois Supreme Court invoked
this provision of the new 1962 code: “a person who kills . . . commits murder
if, in performing the acts which cause death . . . he is attempting or committing a forcible felony.”277 The court argued that this provision’s drafting history showed that "kills" meant simply "performing the acts which cause
death," that the legislature intended that Payne would remain good law, and
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that felons could be held causally responsible for third party killings motivated by resistance to the felony.278 The court added that burglary was classified as a forcible felony,279 and treated it as a violent provocation to deadly
force:
The commission of the burglary, coupled with the election by defendants to flee, set in motion the pursuit by armed police officers. The
shot which killed Detective Loscheider was ...fired in opposition to
the escape of the fleeing burglars, and it was a direct and foreseeable
consequence of defendants' actions. The escape here ...invited retaliation, opposition and pursuit. Those who commit forcible felonies
know they may encounter resistance, both to their affirmative actions
and to any subsequent escape. 280
The felons here supposed to have foreseen police shooting each other after
their flight did not initiate violence, or show weapons.281 Thus, Hickman held
fleeing felons responsible to foresee and prevent even unreasonable police
violence.
New York’s 1965 Penal Law replaced language punishing “killing” in the
course of a felony with a provision punishing one who commits an enumerated felony and “in the course and in furtherance of” the felony he or another
participant “causes death of a person other than one of the participants.”282
By confining those who cause death to participants, confining victims to nonparticipants, and requiring that death be caused “in furtherance,” this language seemed to adopt an agency rule, and this is how the code was applied
for decades.283 In the 1993 case of People v. Hernandez,284 however, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the agency rule adopted in Wood was extinguished by the new statute.285 Thus, “causing death” included proximately
causing death by provoking gunfire.286 Hernandez, in flight from an attempted robbery of an undercover officer, threatened several officers with a
gun. One fired at him, fatally striking another. The court invoked a 1974 causation decision under the new Penal Law, involving depraved indifference
murder, holding a defendant liable for indirectly, but foreseeably, causing
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death.287 The court reasoned that as the Penal Law defined all homicides using the same term, “causes the death,”288 it could not have intended causation
to have a narrower meaning for felony murder.
Courts similarly based proximate cause rules on new codes in six other
states. Alabama relied on its Model Penal Code style causation provision in
a 2009 case.289 Ohio enacted felony murder only in 1998, in a provision using
the phrase “caus[ing] the death of another as a proximate result” of attempting
certain grave felonies.290 Ohio courts had long interpreted a manslaughter
provision with the same causation language as permitting indirect causation.291 In a 1999 involuntary manslaughter case this causation test was used
to hold a car thief liable for death caused by the unreasonably hazardous pursuit by a police officer who was convicted of negligent homicide.292 A 2002
decision applied this proximate cause standard to the 1998 felony murder
provision.293 Georgia’s 1969 code provided that “A person ...commits the
crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of
another human being… .”294 A 2010 decision held that “Georgia is a proximate cause state… [where] ‘cause’ is customarily interpreted in almost all
legal contexts to mean ‘proximate cause’. . . .295 A 1997 Indiana decision
interpreted its 1977 code to require that a felon is responsible for any fatal act
of a non-party "[w]here the accused reasonably should have foreseen that
...the contemplated felony would ...expose another to the danger of death at
the hands of a nonparticipant" ....296 The 1974 Texas code treats as a cause
any act necessary to and creating a risk of the result.297 In a pair of intentional
murder cases, a court held escapees causally responsible for the shooting of
one officer by another under this provision.298 One presumed that this reasoning already applied to felony murder.299 Finally, Wisconsin has used causation of death during a felony as the basis for a substantial sentence enhancement, since the adoption of a new code in 1955. In the 1994 case of State v.
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Oimen, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied such an enhancement to an
absent accomplice of robber killed by the victim.300
In sum, after nearly disappearing, felony murder liability for killings by
those opposing the felony returned in 15 states covering nearly half the nation’s population, by legislative means, and primarily as a result of the widespread recodification of criminal law.
Long before Lyndon Johnson declared war on crime, postwar courts justified shifting blame for police violence onto felons, by portraying them as
invading enemies. Initially rejected as an improper judicial innovation, proximate cause felony murder was later widely enacted legislatively, as part of a
recodification of criminal law coinciding with a national resurgence of penal
severity. And although advocated by liberal law professors in the 1960’s, recodification was achieved by conservative legislators waging the War on
Crime. Felony murder prosecutions of the targets of police violence were
authorized by many of those new codes. Today, we can no longer criticize
proximate cause felony murder rules as judicial innovations. Sadly, they have
a majoritarian warrant. Critics will need to show majorities why these rules
are unjust. Our next part provides that argument.
V. A RACIAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF BLAMING FELONS FOR POLICE VIOLENCE.
A. Race and Police Violence in the War on Crime.
We have seen that felony murder liability for proximately causing police
violence was born of a metaphor portraying law enforcement as warfare.
Within this metaphor, crime was both aggression and a fuse, inevitably triggering an explosive response. As a mechanical metaphor, the proximate
cause standard at once blames felons for triggering deaths and effaces the
intervening agency of police. As a war metaphor, it presents crimes and arrests not as individual cases, but as collective action, with each crime a battle
in a larger war. Likening felonies to warfare provides a blanket justification
for killing felons. This blame-shifting use of war metaphors preceded and
anticipated the War on Crime, with roots in such internal conflicts as the Civil
War and the World War I Red Scare.301 However, the “War on Crime”
300
State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (citing Walter Dickey, David Schultz & James L.
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Racial Divisions and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands (2009) 1-17, 198-238 (Bisbee deportation
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announced by Lyndon Johnson in 1965302 gave this metaphor new life, and a
specifically racial significance.303 This section reconstructs the expressive
significance of the new proximate cause standards, in the larger context of a
“War” on Black people that was much more than a metaphor.
It is important to locate this “War on Crime” among a larger set of war
metaphors. In 1961, President Kennedy had declared a “total attack on delinquency.”304 Only a year earlier, in his first State of the Union address, Johnson had announced the "War on Poverty," as a remedy for racial injustice.305 These metaphors evoked the continuous Cold War against communism while also justifying a potentially controversial federal role in local
issues.306 Indeed, historian Mary Dudziak has shown that national leaders saw
civil rights enforcement "as a cold war imperative" to improve America's image abroad.307 Historian Elizabeth Hinton has shown that these leaders also
saw Black urban poverty as a crime risk and as "social dynamite" set to explode.308
Hinton has emphasized the pivotal role of "Black rebellion"—referred to
as "riots" in the press—from 1964 and 1972 in the construction of crime policy as warfare.309 She describes a “cycle”310 in which violent police harassment of Blacks provoked protest and collective defensive force, followed by
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further indiscriminate police violence. Although police-initiated, these "riots"
provoked white consternation and were conflated with escalating levels of
crime:
From the ashes of the Watts 'riot' in August 1965, a growing consensus of policymakers, federal administrators, law enforcement officials, and journalists came to understand crime as specific to black
urban youth. They concluded that only intensified enforcement of the
law in black urban neighborhoods, where contempt for authority
seemed widespread, would quell the anarchy and chaos in the nation's
streets.311
According to President Johnson, "the riots as well as other criminal and
juvenile delinquency problems in our cities--are closely connected" and were
"aggravated by hoodlums and habitual lawbreakers."312 Thus, collective protest against discriminatory police violence was reinterpreted as crime, while
any crime with a Black perpetrator was reinterpreted as a collective challenge
to legal authority. In this way, the historic Black common grievance against
police brutality was reinterpreted as a common motive for criminal offending
and a rationale for discriminatory suspicion.
Police increasingly understood patrolling predominantly Black communities as their primary mission, conceptualized as the military occupation of
hostile territory.313 The contemporaneous Vietnam conflict became a doubleedged metaphor for police presence in inner cities.314 Bluntly put, the War on
Crime came to signify a war on Black communities. This perception would
later be reflected in statistical disparities in the treatment of Black and whites
at every stage of the criminal justice process during the War on Crime.315
Hinton has demonstrated the political centrality of "riots", by documenting over 2,000 of these conflicts between 1964 and 1972.316 Police officials
routinely justified police violence by exaggerating the scale of Black
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violence.317 In the Newark rebellion of 1967, for example, 24 of 26 fatalities
were Black protestors.318 Matthew Lassiter reports that in at least 21 of 35
fatal shootings by police during the 1967 Detroit rebellion, "eyewitness testimony . . . or forensic evidence contradicted the official accounts."319 "Riots"
sometimes played a direct role in reshaping routine police law enforcement.
Thus, the Detroit Police Department responded to criticism for violating its
use of force policies during the "riot," not by changing institutional behavior
but by loosening those policies to encourage deadly force against fleeing suspects. As a result, "[t]he Detroit Police Department killed at least 108 people
between 1971 and 1973 . . . [a]lmost all . . . young African American males,
and the majority . . . unarmed."320 Twenty-two of these victims were killed
by “STRESS,” a squad of robbery decoys, presaging the one that killed Julius
Tate.321 Riot suppression had become a routine mode of policing.
Illinois, birthplace of the proximate cause doctrine, was another key battleground in the War on Crime. Between 1964 and 1972, Illinois endured 210
"riots."322 These unfolded in the typical cycle of racist policing, Black protest,
and violent police response. The 1969 law enforcement killing of sleeping
Black Panther leader Fred Hampton in Chicago was widely seen as retaliation
for his calls for organized resistance to the police.323 During the next two
decades, Chicago Police Commander John Burge and his subordinates tortured over a hundred Black suspects.324
Neither Burge's systematic use of torture nor his targeting of Black victims were isolated phenomena.325 A 2006 study of policing in Chicago found
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the department widely perceived as “brutal, racist, and corrupt.”326 These patterns were again reflected in police shootings. One study tallied 523 civilians
shot by Chicago police between 1974 and 1978, resulting in 132 killings.
Although whites outnumbered Blacks 60.5% to 32.1% in the general population in 1970, 70% of those shot were Black and 20% white.327 Thus Black
Chicagoans were almost 7 times more likely to get shot by police then white
ones. Chicago police reported killing 70 victims between 2010 and 2014 of
which, 65% were Black.328 Statewide, the Washington Post database identified 113 fatal police shootings in the state of Illinois between 2015 and January 2021.329 Of these, 58% were Black, and 28% were white, although the
2020 state population was 14% Black and 77% white.330 Thus, Black residents of Illinois were 11 times more likely to be killed by police than white
residents.
These depressing statistics align with historical research on the origins of
penal severity and militant policing. It seems racial animus has shaped not
only the distribution of police violence but also background decisions to
adopt violent policies and practices of policing in the first place. These practices threaten all and debase the vocation of police themselves. The
reemergence of proximate cause felony murder during this period must be
read against the background of these changes in policing.
B. Race and Felony Murder
A promising strategy for critiquing felony murder connects American exceptionalism in criminal justice—reflected in such distinctive features as
mass incarceration, penal severity, incapacitative sentencing, capital punishment and violent policing—to its “peculiar” history of racial subordination.331
Significantly, felony murder became another American exception in the postwar period, as analogous doctrines were abandoned in other common law
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systems.332 Its persistence in spite of academic argument and the American
Law Institute’s proposed reform is usefully seen as one skirmish in the War
on Crime. So, without dismissing familiar criticisms of felony murder as both
disproportionate and inefficacious, we want to shift the focus of critique to
felony murder as a vector of racial subordination. The persistence and expansion of felony murder in that period suggests that, like recidivist statutes,333
felony murder became attractive less as a method of crime control than as a
trope of “backlash.”334 If so, disproportion along many dimensions was a feature, not a bug.
Consider the lay consensus that felony murder liability is disproportionate
for co-felons who do not kill.335 Felony murder seems least appealing as an
expansive doctrine of accessorial liability for a killing by a co-felon. Academic and public calls for abolishing the felony murder rule often highlight
defendants punished as murderers for relatively minor roles when their cofelon kills.336 Moral outrage is easily mobilized on behalf of a young driver
imprisoned for decades for idling in a car while a routine drug deal turned
deadly.337 Granting that under reasonably just economic and political circumstances, it is wrong to aid an illegal transaction for pay,338 that wrong pales
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in comparison to murder, as the lay public acknowledges. Such sentences
punish offenders, not for killing, but for associating with killers—and so bespeaks a view of crime as affiliation or identity rather than conduct. And to
the extent that identity fused “Black” with “criminal” in the public mind,
those who would bear this disproportionate punishment seemed to warrant
no deep concern.339 Indeed officials expanding felony murder liability likely
assumed their constituents wanted them to impose disproportionate punishment.
The limited statistical evidence available suggests felony murder prosecution has indeed been discriminatory. A recent study of felony murder
charges in Minnesota’s Hennepin and Ramsey Counties (the Minneapolis
metro area where Derek Chauvin was tried) reported that whites made up
77% of the population, but only 20% of the defendants convicted of felony
murder. Thus, a person of color was 12 times more likely than a white person
to be convicted of felony murder.340
A recent study examined felony murder charges since 2010 in Cook
County, Illinois, which was 65% white and 24% Black according to 2019
census estimates.341 During the period studied, 768 Black defendants and 80
white defendants had been charged with felony murder; and ultimately, 96
Blacks and 9 whites were sentenced for this crime.342 Thus Black Cook
County residents were 26 times more likely to be charged with felony murder
and 29 times more likely to be convicted, than white residents. The attrition
from charging to sentencing is also striking, suggesting that felony murder
charges are viewed cynically by prosecutors, as bargaining chips, “upcharges” they add because they can.
Next, a 2020 survey of Pennsylvania’s inmate population found that 70%
of those imprisoned for felony murder were Black,343 although the Black population was only 12%.344 Thus Blacks were 17 times more likely to be imprisoned for felony murder than other Pennsylvanians.
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Finally, a review of Colorado felony murder charges and convictions
from 2015-2019 presented to the legislature by the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar found that non-Hispanic whites comprised only 20% of those
charged with, and 34% of those convicted of, felony murder, although that
group is 68% of the state population. Blacks comprised 41% of those charged
and 31% of those convicted, but only 4.6% of the population.345 Thus it appeared that Blacks were 30 times more likely to be charged and 13 times more
likely to be convicted of felony murder than whites.
In sum, not only can felony murder rules authorize disproportionate liability, they have been imposed on a racially disparate basis anywhere anyone
has looked.
C. Proximate Cause: From Discriminatory Policing to Discriminatory
Prosecution.
Having explored racial disparities in police violence and in felony murder
charging, we now turn to the convergence of these vectors in prosecuting
felons for police killings in the states that embraced broad proximate cause
felony murder rules during what we have described as a racialized War on
Crime. Data is limited, and of necessity, the case we make is anecdotal and
qualitative rather than quantitative. But because we are concerned with meanings, the stories matter, as do the people whose stories they are.
The expansion of felony murder to embrace killings of felons, bystanders,
and fellow officers by police, requires us to deny the testimony of our own
eyes as to who is killing whom. Recall that, according to Robinson and Darley, killings of co-felons by those resisting the felony are those the lay public
finds least punishable.346 Perhaps the public finds only the dead felon at fault
for having made himself liable to harm,347 though it should be noted that
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recent cases show that the public sometimes finds the violence of those resisting felonies unjustified.348 But even where there may be consensus that
murder liability for the co-felon seems justified—where a felon has recklessly
provoked a defensive killing—we will argue that a felony murder rule is not
necessary for murder liability. In any case, the popularly perceived disproportion of felony murder in these cases seems reason enough for an agency
limitation. As Robinson and Darley have argued, divergence between criteria
of liability and popularly perceived desert erodes the legitimacy of criminal
prohibitions on which compliance chiefly depends.349
Yet legislatures perversely added this most controversial form of felony
murder during the racially inflected war on crime. Felons were not just guilty
of getting shot at; they were guilty of getting shot at while Black. A rule imposing flagrantly disproportionate punishment on the basis of participation in
a felony, like a recidivist statute, expresses that such offenders do not deserve
desert, and that their welfare is of little value. They are not recognized as
partners in a social contract, sharing in its burdens and benefits,350 or as included in a social welfare function, in which penal severity yields diminishing
returns.351 In this context, disproportionate punishment is an expression of
disdain. That this disdain is expressed at the discretion of prosecutors is troubling. That their discretion can be influenced by police, in cases where police
killed is more troubling still.
Proximate causation is troubling enough when imposing a tenuous link
between a felon and a death no one seemed to cause: a homeowner suffers a
heart attack after trapping a burglar, a police officer falls off a roof, a toddler
runs into the path of a stolen car.352 But proximate causation is problematic
not only because it often punishes offenders disproportionately relative to
their actual blameworthiness. It can also illicitly shift punishment, drawing
our eyes from the truly blameworthy. Thus, in the circumstances of an unjustified police killing, the power of prosecutors to indict for felony murder enables them to shift blame from the appropriate person onto the shoulders of
the defendant. This is unfair not only to the defendant unjustly blamed but to
the victim left unvindicated. Indeed, in some cases, like that of John Givens,
a felon blamed for an officer’s unjustified killing of a co-felon is also a victim
of police abuse. Shifting the appropriate legal blame spares the appropriate

348

See, e.g., Clay, supra note 51.
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. L. REV. 453, 457-58,
468-490 (1997).
350
For the classic formulation of this Kantian account of retributive desert, see Herbert Morris,
Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (October 1968).
351
For critique of incapacitation as violating the utility principle by excluding offenders from the
social welfare calculus , see Binder & Notterman, supra note 35, at 3-4, 43-50.
352
See Binder, supra note 12, at 405–407 (collecting several cases where death seemed too unlikely ex ante to impose blame).
349

54

Harvard Law & Policy Review

[Vol. 17

agent censure and punishment and obscures the wrongful nature of her actions.
In these scenarios, the defendant serves a lengthy sentence in place of a
wrongdoer too privileged to punish. Here, a felon, who after all was engaged
in wrongdoing, makes for a tempting defendant, a scapegoat on whom to heap
blame. And all too often that defendant—poor, Black, shadowed by a record,
inevitably spending most of his time with others similarly circumstanced—is
ready-made in our social imagination to be blamed and banished.353 This natural temptation makes the use of proximate cause to shift blame from the
privileged to the pariah all too predictable. In this process, the truly culpable
wrongdoer escapes not just punishment but even inspection.354 Thus extended
by proximate causation, felony murder liability has too often obscured and
excused police violence, particularly against Black and Brown men.
We can best see this convergence of disproportion and discrimination in
both policing and prosecution in Illinois. The dynamic is most visible there
because of the long and successful struggle of activists and journalists to expose police violence and prosecutorial connivance355 and to finally persuade
legislators to impose an agency limit on felony murder.356 Illinois is also a
fitting place to survey because it was the birthplace of the proximate cause
doctrine in the Payne and Hickman cases. Later decisions there would confirm that felony murder liability extended to the deaths of co-felons and the
killing of a co-felon by police or a resisting victim.357
The interaction of this broad felony murder rule with racial profiling is
well illustrated by the notorious 1989 Illinois case of People v. Jenkins.358
Officers Hattenberger and Brunkella of the Chicago Police Department were
dispatched as part of a “tactical squad” to suppress drug-dealing near a
school. Hattenberger observed Allison Jenkins, a Black male immigrant from
Belize, approach a vehicle and receive a bag of potato chips, which the police
later claimed contained marijuana. Hattenberger confronted Jenkins with a
cocked .45.359 According to Hattenberger, Jenkins ran and the officer
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"chambered a bullet," and pursued.360 According to Jenkins, he backed away
until he collided with Brunkella. All witnesses agreed that Hattenberger, still
waving the gun, tackled Jenkins.361 All three men fell, and Hattenberger shot
and killed Brunkella.362 Hattenberger claimed that unnamed sources had told
him that Jenkins carried a gun and that Jenkins had moved his hands to his
middle.363 He further claimed that Jenkins had elbowed him in the chest and
that Jenkins’ later effort to shake himself free from Hattenberger’s grip
caused Hattenberger to fall.364 Jenkins denied striking Hattenberger, instead
claiming that the gun discharged when Hattenberger struck him with it.365
Jenkins was convicted of battery, a felony when committed against a police
officer, and felony murder. Although the jury instructions (initially proposed
by the prosecution) failed to require the jury to find that Jenkins foreseeably
caused Brunkella’s death, this conviction was upheld on appeal.366 The Seventh Circuit later ruled the instruction harmless error, as no juror could have
reasonably doubted Jenkins’ guilt.367 That Jenkins fled from a death threat
proved he foresaw a danger of death.
Nevertheless, a Chicago Tribune story quoted Jenkins as saying he believed he might not have been convicted if there were more than one Black
on the jury.368 Nine other black jurors were stricken, four by the prosecution,
for such ostensibly race-neutral reasons as living in a high crime area, renting,
having been falsely accused of crime, having not worked long at their current
jobs, and being poorly dressed.369 The lone Black juror, a young teacher, tearfully reported that she held out for acquittal for nine hours before giving in
but "couldn't do it [her]self."370 She said that the other jurors could not believe
that police would use unnecessary force: "they were completely out of touch
with reality, with the way things can be (in the city) and are."371 Jurors never
learned that Hattenberger had previously shot another officer he bumped into
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the scene. ….[A] properly instructed, rational jury would have found causation beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 496; See also Linnet Myers, A Shot is Fired, a Cop Dies, But is it Murder? CHI.TRIB.,
Oct. 30, 1987; Jack Clark, Who Killed Jay Brunkella? CHI. READER, Jan. 25 1988.
368
Myers, supra note 367.
369
See Jenkins, 190 Ill. App.3d at 141.
370
Myers, supra note 367; Clark, supra note 365.
371
Myers, supra note 367.
361
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with a cocked gun.372 A second juror later became convinced Hattenberger
had lied about the circumstances of the shooting after visiting the scene.373
Even some police blamed Hattenberger and criticized the prosecution.374 The
case illustrates how easily self-serving police testimony can persuade white
jurors—and judges—that a Black suspect caused police to use unreasonable
force.
A 2016 Chicago Reader investigative report identified a pattern of felony
murder prosecutions of the targets of particularly troubling uses of police
force in Cook County.375 The authors reported finding ten arrestees charged
with felony murder for police killings during the preceding five years.376 The
cases also illustrate patterns of racial disparity in police shootings and in felony murder charges. These included the cases of John Givens and Leland
Dudley, described above, convicted of the felony murder of their partner David Strong, after police shot all three unarmed Black men multiple times.377
Officers offered the strange explanation that they fired volleys of bullets into
the stationary vehicle because an officer might have been under it.378
Another disturbing case of fatal police violence was the killing of Marquise Sampson. Tevin Louis and Sampson, his best friend, were troubled Chicago teens navigating difficult childhoods pocked with foster care and poverty.379 On a summer evening in 2012, the 19-year-olds allegedly robbed a
local restaurant of $1200 when Sampson crossed paths with police officer
Dicarlo.380 Sampson and Louis fled in separate directions and Dicarlo pursued Sampson. Although Dicarlo claimed Sampson pointed a gun at him,
video footage did not show that.381 Dicarlo shot Sampson three times, once
in the back, killing him. Although Louis did not arrive on the scene until after

372

Id.
See id.
374
See Clark, supra note 367.
375
Flowers & Macaraeg, supra note 112. The story recounted the 2006 case of Tristan Scaggs, a
passenger in a stolen car at which police fired almost 70 bullets, with no return fire. Scaggs, who was
shot by police while lying on the ground, was charged with felony murder for the killing of his two
companions by police. All three shooting victims were Black. See also People v. Scaggs, 2021 Ill. App.
173017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
376
Flowers & Macaraeg, supra note 112.
377
Givens was sentenced to 20 years and Dudley to 25. See Peter Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court
won't review Illinois ‘Felony Murder’ Law, SO. ILLINOISAN (Nov. 25, 2019), https://thesouthern.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/us-supreme-court-won-t-review-illinois-felony-murder-law/article_84b16866-d391-5996-91ec-3922cd31f554.html [https://perma.cc/7GWT-GLPZ]
378
Petition for Writ Certiorari, Givens v. Illinois, 2018 IL App (1st) 152031-U* at P*12. chromeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/189761/103313/20190618144715676_Givens%20cert%20Pet%20.pdf at pp. 4-6
379
Flowers & Macaraeg, supra note 112.
380
Id.
381
Id.; See also Amy Goodman, Alison Flowers, Sarah Macareg, A Shocking Story of How a
Chicago Cop Killed a Teen — Then Locked Up His Best Friend for the Murder, DEMOCRACY NOW
(August
22,
2016),
https://www.democracynow.org/2016/8/22/a_shocking_story_of_how_a
[https://perma.cc/3KTM-WNWN].
373
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Sampson had been shot, Louis was charged with the murder, while Di Carlo
won a medal.382
Other cases included that of Timothy Jones, a Black man, charged with
the death of motorist Jacqueline Reynolds, a Black woman,383 whom a police
vehicle killed while chasing Jones after he fled a home invasion burglary.384
Similarly, Erik Martinez, Latino, a passenger in a car driven by Rafael Cruz,
also Latino, was charged with Cruz's murder after Cruz was shot by an officer
who had previously killed three other civilians. Martinez was accused of having provoked this shooting by firing at another car and so was charged with
felony murder.385 Martel Odom and Akeem Clarke, both Black, were charged
with the felony murder of their accomplice, 17 year-old Cedric Chatman, in
a carjacking. The unarmed Chatman (also Black) was fatally shot by police
while fleeing. Odom and Clarke were blocks away.386
Devante Graham, then 17, and Emmanuel Johnson, then 15, both Black,
were charged with the felony murder of their accomplice in robbery, when
16 year old Deonta Mackey, (also Black) was fatally shot by the robbery victim, an off-duty officer.387 Finally, Breanna Patterson, a 20 year old Black
woman, was charged with felony murder after police fatally shot her accomplice in robbery, Charles Smith, also Black.388
Of the ten felony murder defendants charged with killings actually committed by police, nine were Black, and none were white. Six of seven victims
were Black. None were white. As a result of cases like these, activists in Illinois framed felony murder reform as a racial justice issue, and in 2021 the
382

Flowers & Macaraeg, supra note 112.
Jacqueling Reynolds, HOMICIDE WATCH CHI., http://chicago.homicidewatch.org/category/victims/jacqueline-reynolds/index.html [https://perma.cc/8ATZ-RFNR]. Jones was sentenced to 22-28
years. Steve Schmadeke, Man Given 28 Years in Prison for Chicago Police Chase that Turned Fatal,
CHI.TRIB. (May 1, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-fatal-police-chase-sentencing-met-20150501-story.html [https://perma.cc/CJ6R-MS5Y].
384
See Flowers & Macaraeg, supra note 112. Criminal, 76th and Yates, supra note 112.
385
See Flowers & Macaraeg, supra note 112.
386
See Emily Morris, 2 Men Charged with Carjacking, Murder After Fatal Police Shooting,
DNA INFO (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20130109/south-shore-above79th/2-men-charged-with-carjacking-murder-after-fatal-police-shooting/
[https://perma.cc/58VTLFBJ]; Email from Sarah Macareag, to Guyora Binder (Sept. 13, 2021) (on file with author). Each
eventually pled guilty to robbery and auto-theft and was sentenced to 10 years. See Jorden Owen, Two
Men Two Men Get 10 Years in Prison for Fatal Police Chase and Shooting, CHI. SUN TIMES (Sept. 22,
2015), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2015/9/22/18442502/two-men-get-10-years-in-prison-for-fatalpolice-chase-and-shooting [].
387
Emmanuel Johnson, HOMICIDE WATCH CHI., http://chicago.homicidewatch.org/category/suspects/emmanuel-johnson/index.html. Graham was sentenced to 25 years. Rummana Hussain, Man
Gets 25 Years for Deadly Robbery That Claimed Life of Cohort, CHI. SUN TIMES, (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/04/27/armed-robbery-devante-graham-guilty-plea/.
388
See Woman Charged in Connection with Fatal Police-Involved Shooting in Englewood, ABC
7 CHICAGO, (Feb. 2, 2016), https://abc7chicago.com/englewood-police-standoff-73rd-and-paulina/1183467/ [https://perma.cc/4UJM-FRHP]; Charles M Smith, EB WIKI, https://ebwiki.org/cases/charles-m-smith [https://perma.cc/BH87-3PAZ]. Patterson ultimately received an 18year sentence for robbery. See https://www.insideprison.com/state-inmate-search.asp?lnam=Patterson&fnam=Breanna&county=cook&st_abb=IL&id=2026185172
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Illinois legislature imposed an agency limit on felony murder as part of a
comprehensive reform bill targeting police misconduct.389 In Colorado, similarly, supporters framed a 2021 bill adopting an agency rule as a racial justice
reform.390
But this pattern is not limited to Illinois and Colorado. Similar examples
continue to proliferate across the country. Consider D’Angelo Burgess,
pulled over for a routine traffic stop in Tulsa, Oklahoma.391 Burgess panicked
and fled from police, who pursued at over 100 mph.392 Policing experts counsel against high-speed chases as among the most dangerous policing practices
and indeed, such chases violated department policy.393 One officer lost control of his car and struck and killed fellow officer Heath Meyer. Officer
Meyer became the eighth person in just over a year killed in Oklahoma in a
police chase, two of them, uninvolved drivers.394 It was ultimately Burgess

389
Pivotal in this effort was the 2019 killing of 14 year old Ja’Quan Swopes, fatally shot by a
suburban homeowner in Lake County when he and five other black teens attempted to steal the homeowner’s car. The remaining five were initially charged with felony murder. See Jobi Cates, Lake County
Case Shows Why Illinois Should Abolish The Felony Murder Rule, Chicago Sun-Times, CHI. SUN TIMES
(August 15, 2019), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/8/15/20807715/felony-murder-rule-illinoisgurnee-teens-lake-county-restore-justice-jobi-cates [https://perma.cc/NK2N-YHQC]; Frank S. Aberholden, Community Meeting Focuses on Felony Murder Law Used to Charge 5 Teens in Botched Lake
County Car Theft, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/lake-countynews-sun/ct-lns-old-mill-creek-shooting-meeting-st-0904-20190905-zsdiwsypyjfitbqvjialgpj3tmstory.html [https://perma.cc/2E4H-Q9D4]. In legislative testimony in support of what would become
the felony murder provision of HB 3653, abolishing Illinois' proximate cause rule, the group also referenced the Timothy Jones case. Cates, supra n. 356 supra. Proximate cause cases like these helped
reframe felony murder reform as an issue of racial justice in Illinois.
390
See Marianne Goodland, Felony Murder Bill Wins Preliminary Approval in the House, COLO.
POL. (April 23, 2021)(“‘We have a doctrine that is profoundly problematic’ against people of color
[sponsor Mike] Weissman added,.”); Changes to Felony Murder: Hearing on SB21-124 Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 2021 Leg., 72nd Sess. (Co. 2021) (testimony of Curtis Brooks, Philip
Cherner),
https://sg001-harmony.sliq.net/00327/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20210318/41/11143 [https://perma.cc/CA4U-XCW7].
391
See Schwartzapfel, supra note 112.
392
See id.
393
See John P. Gross, Unguided Missiles: Why the Supreme Court Should Prohibit Officers From
Shooting at Moving Vehicles, 164 PENN. L. REV. ONLINE 135, 137–141 (2016); Brief for The Association of Trial Lawyers of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (No. 96-1337); See Tim Grimmond, Police Pursuits: Traveling a Collision Course, POLICE CHIEF, July 1993, at 43, 47; Michael Avery, Police Chases: More Deadly Than
a Speeding Bullet?, Trial, Dec. 1 (1997); M. Amanda Racines, Case Note, Constitutional Law--To
Chase or Not to Chase: What "Shocks the Conscience" in High-Speed Police Pursuits?—County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), 73 TEMP L. REV. 413, 438–439. In three notorious analogous cases, the Supreme Court has limited the Constitutional restrictions on police high-speed chases
that lead to death or serious injury. In Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court held that police pursuit must
“shock the conscience” for a due process violation to occur. 523 U.S. 833, 846–847 (1998). In Scott v.
Harris, the Supreme Court ruled that an officer’s attempt to terminate a high-speed chase by forcing a
fleeing offender off the road did not constitute unreasonable force even if it put that driver’s life and
those of bystanders in jeopardy. 550 U.S. 372, 379-380, 385-386 (2007). And in Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765 , 769, 775-778(2014), the court applied Scott v. Harris, to justify firing 15 shots into an
immobilized car to end a chase. Id. at 777.
394
A similar tragic story occurred last year when a police chase resulted in a crash between a
police car and an Uber driver, Bismark Asare, killing the Asare. See Texas Uber Driver Killed in Crash
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who was charged with felony murder.395 Even if one believes Burgess shares
blame for Meyer’s death, the felony murder charge effaces the role of irresponsible police behavior. Only now, years later, has the State legislature began to consider regulating police chases.396
Or consider 15-year-old Lakeith Smith, who participated in two burglaries in Millbrook Alabama, along with four other Black teens, two of whom
were armed. Police confronted and exchanged gunfire with the group, fatally
shooting 16-year-old A’Donte Washington. Smith, who was also unarmed,
was convicted of felony murder along with other crimes, and received consecutive sentences totaling 65 years.397
Or 14-year-old Johnny Reed, charged with the felony murder along with
two others, for the killing by Phoenix police of 19 year old Jacob Harris en
route from a robbery. Police, following the group in six unmarked cars, disabled the vehicle and threw a flash grenade. Jacob Harris ran from the car.
Police fired a volley of shots, striking him fatally in the back. Although police claimed that he fired shots, neither video nor ballistics evidence confirmed this. Harris was Black, as are two of those charged with his murder.398
Or the cases of Christopher Ransom, who held up a phone store in Queens
with a toy gun, and the unarmed Jagger Freeman who served as a lookout.
After police surrounded the store, Ransom emerged, along with two detectives in plain clothes. They were met with a volley of 42 shots fired by seven
officers. Ransom survived multiple gunshots, but one of the detectives did

with Police Involved in High-speed Chase, WLVT 8 NEWS, (Aug. 2, 2020),
https://www.wvlt.tv/2020/08/02/texas-uber-driver-killed-in-crash-with-police-involved-in-highspeed-chase/ [https://perma.cc/XNK7-WS6P]. The fleeing suspect was apprehended and charged with
felony murder. See Brian White, Texas Uber Driver Killed In Crash With Police-Involved in HighSpeed Chase, ATT’Y BRIAN WHITE PERS. INJ. LAWS. (August 18, 2020), https://attorneybrianwhite.com/blog/texas-uber-driver-killed-in-crash-with-police-involved-in-high-speed-chase/
[https://perma.cc/TYV5-FQWP].
395
See Corey Jones, Fleeing Driver Convicted of Felony Murder in Death of OHP Lieutenant in
Trooper Collision, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 11, 2019), https://madison.com/news/state-and-regional/fleeing-driver-convicted-of-felony-murder-in-death-of-ohp-lieutenant-in-trooper-collision/article_4e2f5f13-2ee6-5b3e-9069-c6a7d666777d.html [https://perma.cc/HB63-8BDY].
396
See Melissa Scavelli, Lawmaker Requests Study of Police Pursuit Policies, J. REC. (July 13,
2021), https://okcfox.com/news/local/lawmaker-requests-police-pursuit-study-to-create-safer-policy
[https://perma.cc/Q89Z-3NKE].
397
See Jamiles Lartey, Alabama Police Shot a Teen Dead, but His Friend Got 30 Years for the
Murder, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/H4PN-DLZH]. The sentence was subsequently reduced to 55 years. See Krista Johnson, Accomplice Law Case of Lakeith Smith, Sentenced To
55 Years, Gains Renewed Interest, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (June 11, 2020), https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/crime/2020/06/11/alabama-case-lakeith-smith-inmate-sentenced55-years-gains-renewed-interest/5344257002/ [https://perma.cc/A2BV-NNRL].
398
See Meg O’Connor, Police Shot Jacob Harris—Then Charged His Friends with Murder, PHX.
NEW TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/phoenix-cops-shot-jacob-harris-charged-friends-with-murder-11319507 [https://perma.cc/X4U7-XKYY]; Emily Wilder, A Police
Officer Killed Jacob Harris, But His Unarmed Friends Were Charged with His Murder, BUZZFEED
NEWS (August 24, 2021), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilywilder/police-shooting-felonymurder-third-party [https://perma.cc/QP8B-DJBP].
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not. Ransom and Freeman, both Black were both charged with felony murder.399 Freeman was recently convicted of felony murder.400
Lastly, consider the analogous story of the chronically mentally ill Glenn
Broadnax, also Black, who tried to kill himself in traffic in Times Square.401
When he attracted police attention, the police response to his behavior was to
open fire in a crowded, world famous tourist destination, striking two innocent bystanders.402 One, ironically a mental health expert trained to handle
just such situations, observed that police missed every opportunity to deescalate the situation; the other, disabled by her injuries, has sued the NYPD.403
Again, the police response avoided scrutiny when prosecutors convicted the
mentally ill Broadnax of assault crimes.404
Too be sure, none of these stories is simple.405 Many of those charged
engaged in dangerous and reprehensible criminal behavior. But it is not only
perfect people who deserve to survive police encounters. Policing is not just
a matter of if the police become involved but how the police use force once
they are involved.. To be sure police proverbially make “split second life and
death” decisions.406 But occasions when deliberation is impossible are too

399
See Christopher Ransom Pleads Guilty in Friendly Fire Death of NYPD Detective Brian Simonsen, EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct 20, 2021), https://abc7ny.com/christopher-ransom-brian-simonsenjagger-freeman-t-mobile-store-robbery/11147156/ [https://perma.cc/YT49-AYWT].
400
See Deshenia Andrews, Queens Man convicted of Murder in NYPD Cops Friendly Fire Death,
N.Y. POST (June 13, 2022), https://nypost.com/2022/06/13/man-convicted-of-murder-in-nypd-copsfriendly-fire-death/ [https://perma.cc/K63K-XXXV].
401
See Ben Yakas, Mentally Ill Man Charged With Assault Because Cops Shot Two Bystanders,
THE GOTHAMIST, (December 5, 2013).
402
See id.
403
See Jon Campbell, After NYPD Open Fire On an Unarmed, Mentally-Ill Man in Times Square,
Who Gets the Blame? THE VILLAGE VOICE (August 10, 2016), https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/08/10/after-the-nypd-opened-fire-on-an-unarmed-mentally-ill-man-in-timessquare-who-gets-the-blame/ [https://perma.cc/ZAE8-7BNA].
404
Rebecca Rosenberg, ‘Deranged’ Times Square Man Sentenced to Two Years in Prison, N.Y.
POST (March 11, 2015), https://nypost.com/2015/03/11/deranged-times-square-man-sentenced-to-twoyears-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/K9DA-EHC7].
405
While this article focuses on the way felony murder obscures unreasonable police behavior, a
similar observation could be made in cases of questionable non-police uses of self-defense. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. State, 782 S.E.2d 657, 661-662 (Ga. 2016) (finding defendant guilty of felony murder of
his accomplice in an attempted robbery of a business after the accomplice was shot in self-defense by
the business owner and defendant failed to immediately inform police that wounded accomplice was
in crashed and abandoned getaway vehicle); People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 977-979 (Ill.
1997)(finding defendant guilty of felony murder where the target of an attempted robbery wrestled the
gun away from defendant and accidentally shot a bystander as defendant fled the scene of the robbery);
Layman v. State, 42 N.E.3d 972, 979-981 (Ind. 2015) (reaffirming proximate cause standard, but nevertheless overturning felony murder convictions for two defendants who burglarized a home while
unarmed and whose co-conspirator was shot and killed by the home’s occupant, providing insufficient
evidence of foreseeability).
406
The oft (and overused) incantation that deadly force by police is often dispensed with “split
second” decisions is recognized in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even in circumstances that
seem to utterly belie such urgency. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). It is
further reified in our policing norms. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 865
(2014). But too little attention is paid to the unwise, negligent or reckless police decisions which force
such “split second” decisions. See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment,
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often the product of avoidable choices. Police operations that create predictably explosive and fatal circumstances should be recognized as reckless. Indeed, the deaths that arise from these volatile setups are in some ways more
blameworthy than rash police shootings in sudden circumstances. In reckless
stings like the Saunders case, stakeouts like the Hickman case, needless
chases like the Burgess case, or stopping cars with guns, as in the Givens
case, police deliberately construct high noon confrontations and games of
chicken.407
Indeed, a consistent criticism in high profile police killings has been the
over-eagerness of police to charge into situations, thus forcing split-second
decisions. Thus, the killing of Tamir Rice was stunning in part because of
how quickly his life was forfeited. The video shows Officer Loehmann’s car
pull into the frame and Rice’s body crumpling nearly instantaneously.408
Loehmann’s contention that he had to make an instantaneous decision ignores
the obvious fact that it was his aggressive insertion into the situation before
assessing it, that created this false dilemma.409 Likewise, police killings cannot be justified by the urgency of the moment where police tactics themselves
staged urgent life and death decisions. Zooming out from the moment of the
shooting itself and inspecting the wisdom of tactics that narrow options into
fatal pathways exposes many police killings as unnecessary.410
But where blame for those deaths can be shifted onto another criminal
defendant, it is all too easy to avoid that inspection. Thus, the possibility of
shifting all blame to a co-felon perversely incentivizes police violence. Given
a choice between two culprits, one a member of the cohesive organization on
which the prosecutor depends to prove every case, and the other chargeable
with another crime, who will the prosecutor side with? It is not only the felons
who find themselves outgunned in these confrontations.
Of course, shoot-outs are dangerous for all and most police, one hopes,
do not seek danger.411 Thus, the most salient incentive for police will be the
103 VA. L. REV. 211, 228–232, 291–293 (2017); James J. Fyfe, The Split-Second Syndrome and Other
Determinants of Police Violence, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 466,
475–77 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., (2010)).
407
Garrett & Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment n. 406 supra at 214-220, 228.
408
Id. at 214; S. Lamar Sims, Investigation into the Officer-involved Shooting of Tamir Rice
Which Occurred at Cudell Park, 1910 West Boulevard, Cleveland, OH, ON NOVEMBER 22, 2014, at 12
(Oct. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Sims Report], http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdfprosecutor/enUS/Tamir%20Rice% 20Investigation/Sims-Review%20of%20Deadly%20Force-Tamir%20Rice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DCX9-ATCS]; Kimberly A. Crawford, Review of Deadly Force Incident: Tamir Rice
2–3 [hereinafter Crawford Report], http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en US/Tamir%20Rice%20Investigation/Crawford-Review%20of%20Deadly%20ForceTamir%20Rice.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GRM-NLBC].
409
Id. at 215-216, 220, 260-261.
410
See Garrett & Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendent supra note 406, at 228-232, 291-293.
411
The classic scholarship in the field was more focused on reducing danger to officers by avoiding circumstances calling for deadly force. See, e.g., POLICE ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING: INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 159 (M.R. Haberfeld et al. eds., 2012) (interviewing seminal policing practice scholar James Joseph Fyfe.)
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possibility of harm to themselves. But budgets must be justified, brass will
stage theatrical operations, and when forced into danger, caution will push
police to shoot first.412 What is less clear is how to incentivize police to be
solicitous of the lives of even felons they must arrest.413 We cannot prove that
rewarding killing with a collar as well as a medal actually adds to the carnage.
But it expresses, through our legal doctrine, that the lives and futures of felons
are forfeit.
Moreover, immunizing police from scrutiny permits them to engage in
tactics that show Black life is considered cheap. After all, incentives are unnecessary where police already highly value the lives of civilians.414 We are
unlikely to see police set up explosive stings in wealthy, white neighborhoods.415 But where the lives of the likely victims are not valued, being
shielded from the consequences liberates the police to implement dangerous
policing tactics.416 Regardless of the legal regime, a sting that would be unthinkably risky in a White neighborhood may be accepted as the cost of police
business in a poorer minority neighborhood. But a doctrine that so readily
shifts blame for police violence onto the companions of those killed invites
police to shoot on location, wherever they expect felons to be found.

412
This is probably exacerbated by the systematic lack of clear guidance in police departments as
to the appropriate levels of force to use in a wide range of situations. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra
note 404, at 280-285.
413
For example, there remains a split in American jurisprudence as to whether the Fourth Amendment should restrict police force to the least violent methods available. Compare Griffith v. Coburn,
473 F.3d 650, 658 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring officers to effectuate seizures using "the least intrusive
means reasonably available" (quoting St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 774–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
availability of a less-intrusive alternative does not make use of deadly force unreasonable (citing Scott
v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). See also Samuel Walker, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY 51 (1st ed. 2005) (describing minimum-force policies as the "prevailing standard");
Police Use of Force, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/law-enforcement/use-of-force [https://perma.cc/974J-5CSW].
414
See Siegel, supra note 45, at 1074-1081; Osagie Obasogie & Zach Newman, Black Lives
Matter and Respectability Politics in Local News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An
Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 541, 544; Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman,
Police Violence, Use of Force Policies, and Public Health, 43 AM. J. L. AND MED. 279 (2017).
415
Public conversation about the way police use force in executing arrests has spiked since the
tragic shooting death of Breonna Taylor. The conversation surrounds not the fact that police returned
fire when being fired upon but the justification in executing an explosive “no knock” warrant at all. It
is interesting to note the widespread expert condemnation of the same tactics when Federal agents
executed a similar warrant against Paul Manafort. See Brian Dolan, Note: To Knock or Not to Knock?
No-knock Warrants and Confrontational Policing, 93 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 201, 201-205 (2019); cf. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" Was a
"War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 382 (2002);
416
While demographic data is difficult to accurately collect, experts observe the same striking
racial disparities we see elsewhere in policing. See Radley Balko, Opinion, Little Rock's Dangerous
and Illegal Drug War, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/10/14/little-rocks-dangerous-and-illegal-drug-war/?utm_term=.41d32be5732c
[https://perma.cc/ZU5C-7UPJ]; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 33 (2014).
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Lastly, we admit many proximate cause cases, including some explored
here, are ambiguous. Even clearly condemnable cases of police violence often include suspects behaving unacceptably. Whatever happened the night
Julius Ervin Tate, Jr.417 or Marquise Sampson418 were killed, both were engaged in reprehensible and dangerous criminal behavior. We do not minimize
the wrong of robbery. But victims do not have to be blameless for police
killings to be unjustified. For too long, standard political deflection of police
accountability centered on smearing the victim of lethal police violence.419
Michael Brown, killed in Ferguson, allegedly with his hands up, was publicly
impeached with videos of him stealing a package of cigarillos.420 Walter
Scott, shot in the back by Officer Michael Slager, was indicted in the media
as behind on child support payments.421 This character assassination seems
particularly virulent regarding victims of color who are afforded none of the
media’s generosity in examining the paths leading to their deaths.422 To demand that Black victims of police violence embody virtue before deserving
our regard is to deny them the equal consideration every citizen deserves.
That someone was armed or spurred a police chase is significant but not decisive in determining whether lethal police violence was required.423 Chicagoans, alongside the nation, were rightly incensed upon the release of video
showing the killing of LaQuan McDonald by Officer Jason Van Dyke.
Though McDonald was armed with a knife, the video showed him walking
away from police officers when Van Dyke opened fire. A gun in the waistband does not always justify a shot in the back.
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Indeed, the relativity of perceptions of danger is one reason to preclude
murder liability for the crime of frightening police. That relativity came to
public notice in the famous Fourth Amendment case of Scott v. Harris. Harris, hurrying home from work, led Georgia sheriff’s deputies on a high-speed
chase until Deputy Scott rammed his car, flipping it and rendering Harris a
quadriplegic.424 Assessing the reasonableness of this “seizure,” the Supreme
Court sided with the police in an 8 to 1 decision. 425 In an unprecedented step,
the Court released the dashboard video of the car chase. 426 The majority
writer, Justice Scalia, was so confident that deadly force was reasonable that
he mused that there could be no reasonable disagreement about the video
footage. 427
Such confidence naturally proved irresistible to academic inspection,
leading Professors Kahan, Hoffman and Braman to survey wider assessments
of the video. In the dashcam video, we see Harris’s car weaving in and out of
traffic on a commercial boulevard. 428 We don’t see—but some viewers no
doubt imagined—the view in his rearview mirror: multiple police cars, also
driving dangerously, all chasing one terrified Black man. The court’s decision, upholding summary judgment for Scott, deprived a jury of the opportunity to make that situationally dependent judgment of reasonableness from
a diversity of perspectives. Though the Kahan, Hoffman and Braman survey
found much agreement with the Court’s decision it also found marked divergence of perspective across gender, ethnic and racial lines.429
Like Harris, Jenkins was denied an opportunity to face the judgment of a
properly instructed, diverse jury. Instead, both cases now stand for the legal
proposition that these Black men forced police to use deadly force against by
them, by fleeing in mortal fear that police would kill them. In a society where
police are socialized to identify Black people as dangerous, we cannot condition murder liability on getting shot at by police.
Yet proximate cause felony murder shifts blame for police violence onto
its targets and can thereby obscure where the blame rightfully belongs. Police
officers shooting indiscriminately, pursuing recklessly, or staging avoidable
armed confrontations are all blameworthy, notwithstanding the felon’s part
in the wrongdoing. Too often, felony murder prosecutions divert our attention
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from deadly policing and encourage us to assume that the guilty party has
already been punished.
D. Proximate Cause and Systemic Corruption
While proximate cause felony murder enables police wrongdoing, it
also invites prosecutors to become complicit in that wrongdoing. Police can
expect felony arrestees to bear the blame for their violence, only insofar as
prosecutors place it there. Obviously, prosecutorial discretion remains central
to our criminal justice system, where well over 90% of convictions are
achieved by guilty pleas. Prosecutors, in turn, rely on police to supply evidence and, if necessary, testimony.
Even without the additional weapon of proximate cause felony murder, prosecutors have little incentive to prosecute their working partners for
unjustified use of force and face a heavy burden of proof in doing so.430 The
directly involved officers have incentives to lie about the circumstances and
shift blame onto victims.431 While officer-involved killings are not typically
investigated by the perpetrators, they are usually investigated by the officer’s
colleagues and superiors.
Further, police suspects are afforded rights and advantages that are vastly
more protective than the typical suspect.432 Police culture incentivizes investigators of an officer-involved shooting to look the other way. Union representatives intervene early in these cases, arranging legal representation, often
fostering collusion among police witnesses on statements.433 And the prosecutors who evaluate these cases are typically from the office that regularly
works with the force whose agent committed the killing.434 All of this creates,
obvious conflicts of interest.435 Prosecutors investigating such cases report
pressure from both supervisors and peers to prosecute perps, not police.436
Moreover, prosecutors often face pressure to establish that police killings
were justified—for example by inducing a grand jury to issue a “no-bill”
finding—in order to help the killer to defend a civil rights suit.437 Criminal
conviction of surviving victims of police brutality can discredit them in civil
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rights suits, and prosecutors are often expected to pursue weak charges
against victims, relying on self-serving and dubious police testimony.438
Winning a felony murder conviction of an arrestee can also win favor with
police, by protecting the killer against a civil suit by that arrestee. But blameshifting also protects the officer against suit by the estate of the deceased, by
implying the killing was justified. A felony murder conviction can even preclude a surviving victim’s civil rights suit altogether, under Heck v. Humphrey.439 Further, a felony murder charge for a survivor of police brutality can
be advantageous even without a conviction. Prosecutors can bargain the
charge away in exchange for releasing their police allies from civil liability.440
We might hope that prosecutors in proximate cause states would only
charge felons for those police killings they recklessly provoked with gunfire.
But the incentives we have canvassed—like the cases we have described—
show otherwise. Prosecutors predictably bring disproportionate charges
against felons for unjustified killings by police, because doing so is in their
interest.
Waging war on crime has proliferated a militarized and racialized police
state on our streets and bound millions of our fellow citizens into a degraded
status of unfreedom. Felony murder has been just one weapon in that war—
police and prosecutors would have mistreated suspects without it. But expanding felony murder to encompass killings by non-parties condones abusive policing and invites corrupt prosecution. An agency rule supplies a
prophylactic against the abuse of prosecutorial authority to punish friendless
pariahs for the crimes of police.
But can we hope that legal reform might affect prosecutor and ultimately
police behavior? Consider again the recent police shooting of Stavian Rodriguez, the fifteen-year-old Oklahoma teen, who joined 17-year-old Wyatt
Cheatham in a gas station robbery. 441 Locked in the station by the store clerk
and surrounded by mocking police, the hapless Rodriguez surrendered, pulling out his gun with his thumb and forefinger and dropping it to the ground.442
A crowd of police proceeded to give him inconsistent commands and, when
a seemingly confused Rodriguez moved his hand towards his waist, five
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police officers opened fire, striking him 13 times and killing him. Rodriguez’s absent accomplice, Cheatham, was charged with his murder.443
State v. Cheatham444 was poised to join our list of disproportionate felony
murder convictions until derailed by a confluence of events. Protestors gathered outside Cheatham prison, decrying the use of felony murder against him
as disproportionate punishment for the absent co-defendant. At the same
time, video of the police encounter was released, sparking outcry about
whether the police were justified in opening fire.445 Subsequent to both, the
prosecution dropped the felony murder charges against Cheatham and, more
remarkably, charged the five police officers with first degree manslaughter.446
A number of factors, including compelling video, perhaps contributed to
these hopeful results. Yet one notable feature of this tragedy is the way charging Cheatham with the death of his co-felon initially shielded questionable
and lethal police responses from further legal inspection. Once they could no
longer pin Rodriguez’s death on his co-felon, it seems prosecutors were compelled to ask if his death was in fact justifiable. Were prosecutors systematically foreclosed from the easy blame shifting offered by proximate cause felony murder, such inspection and public accountability of police violence
might be more common.
E. Depraved Indifference
Given the perverse incentives proximate cause felony murder creates, and
the popular moral intuitions against it, why does this doctrine maintain a stubborn grip on a significant minority of jurisdictions? One reason, we have contended, is precisely its appeal to police and prosecutors as a way of shifting
blame onto the victims of often racist police violence. Yet its applications
need not always yield disproportionate results.
Recall that agency rules predicate felony murder on acts taken in furtherance of a dangerous felony. Thus, deaths directly caused by others resisting
a felony fall outside of its ambit. In the examples we have surveyed, e.g., a
police officer needlessly shooting a fleeing suspect, precluding murder liability for the felon seems the better result. But the armed robber who starts a
gun battle with police, or with a cornered storekeeper or homeowner, resulting in a predictable death does seem blameworthy, even if the fatal bullet is
fired by someone else. It is this insight that is marked when court opinions
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note that liability ought not turn on the arbitrary identity of the victim or the
vagaries of forensic ballistics.
Yet such scenarios only counsel for felony murder liability at first blush.
Even without felony murder, there will be independent grounds for murder
liability in such cases. In the classic example, the robber who forces a hostage
into the path of police gunfire does not need to be charged with felony murder. Rather, he can be charged with depraved indifference murder on the basis
of his action. Similarly, as held in the California case of People v. Taylor, a
felon who starts a gun battle, knowing others may well be killed, can be held
liable for such a death, based on the depraved indifference to human life these
actions manifest.447
Beneficially, this basis for murder liability requires proof of recklessness,
requiring that the robber recognize a substantial risk that one or more persons
would be killed.448 The robber’s malign purpose for imposing a known risk
of death supplies the additional measure of “depraved” or “extreme” indifference that often separates this form of unintended murder from "involuntary” (i.e. reckless) manslaughter. This long recognized independent basis of
murder liability captures cases where death results from a felon’s conscious
choice to endanger others. It captures the sense that some atrocious crimes
can be committed in ways so patently dangerous that the deaths they cause
seem morally adjacent to murder.
We have seen that the great majority of states punish murder on the basis
of such aggravated recklessness. Indeed, we propose adoption of such murder
liability in the remaining jurisdictions, as a device for prosecuting unjustified
police homicides. We acknowledge that a few states, like Minnesota, regrettably require that risk be recklessly imposed on more than one person, and
we propose eliminating this requirement. Yet even in these states, it will generally be possible to use depraved indifference murder to prosecute offenders
who initiate fatal gun-battles. So the few scenarios where expansive indirect
causation is most appealing can be prosecuted outside the framework of felony murder, in the great majority of jurisdictions. In judging both unjustifiable police violence and conduct provoking justifiable police violence, depraved indifference murder better captures our intuitions about deserved
blame than does felony murder. And, as we argue in the next Part, aligning
blame with culpability is not just a theoretical concern. Getting the culpability right matters, not only to confine blame to the deserving but also to fulfill
our responsibility to victims—by naming the wrong done them, to say their
names.
Yet causal responsibility matters too. There are grounds for concern about
indirect causal responsibility, even when we require a higher level of culpability towards death. Even if we abolish felony murder altogether and replace
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it with depraved indifference murder, police shootings will challenge the integrity of the criminal justice system. Prosecutors may still be motivated to
shift blame for unjustified police shootings onto suspects. Deference to authority, and hindsight and racial bias, may still induce jurors to overattribute
culpability to suspects, and underestimate the causal agency of police. If depraved indifference murder proves pliable in practice, further reforms—possibly including an agency limit—will be needed there too.
While depraved indifference murder may best capture our moral intuitions about blame for initiating fatal conflict, our criminal justice system too
often weighs desert on a flawed scale. To be sure, in recategorizing certain
types of antisocial conduct as depraved indifference murder rather than felony murder, we narrow liability and better align it with principles of desert.
But the test of reform is practice rather than ideal normative theory. Our case
against broad proximate cause felony murder standards rests on their demonstrable use as weapons in a discriminatory War on Crime. In the next Part,
we propose a similarly grounded critique of felony murder generally. Reform
is not just a matter of making technical changes in the law. It is a work of
changing our community, by naming the injustice we correct.
Given our system’s undue severity and pervasive inequality, any proposal
to replace one standard of blame and punishment with another inevitably invites Abolitionist critique. The heart of that critique is that criminal law cannot solve the underlying social problems at which we aim it, and that every
effort to align it with justice merely feeds its unjust power over poor and
minority communities.449 Yet that a criminal justice system is no substitute
for the social infrastructure of a humane and democratic society does not
mean it has no legitimate function in such a society. Even in a well-governed
society, violent actions that harm others and deny their equal place as citizens
require forceful repudiation. Other societies, although far from perfectly just,
address this task with systems far smaller and more respectful of human dignity than ours. In short, there may be a long road reformers and abolitionists
can travel together before they will need to part ways. So, too, this essay’s
two authors have walked a ways together, learned from our differences, and
shared our conversation with you.
VI. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: APPLYING A RACIAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF
FELONY MURDER, EVEN WHERE IT HURTS
A. From Agency Limits to Felony Murder Abolition
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We have seen that felony murder has operated in many of our populous
and apparently progressive states to obscure and excuse reckless and racially
disparate police violence. But felony murder’s race problem is larger in
scope. The strikingly disparate patterns of felony murder charging and conviction recently documented in metropolitan Chicago and Minneapolis, and
in Pennsylvania and Colorado, suggest that felony murder is a crime prosecutors have seen little need to punish when committed by whites. This suggests that the unexpected persistence of the academically despised felony
murder in the late twentieth century recodification of criminal law reflected
felony murder’s appeal as a weapon in a racialized War on Crime. Felony
murder liability—like recidivist sentencing—seemed attractive precisely because it could inflict arbitrary and extreme punishment for criminality as an
identity rather than an offense.
One reason why felony murder may be little used against white defendants is the availability in most states of other offenses—including involuntary
manslaughter and depraved indifference murder—for unintended homicide.
Those who commit felonies can also be punished for those crimes. So a strong
argument for abolishing felony murder is that we seem to be able to do without it when the perpetrator belongs to a privileged majority. Deterring and
denouncing crime does not require felony murder, however useful it may be
in selectively attributing and denouncing criminality. We have proposed that
every felony murder rule incorporate an agency limit as a prophylactic
against displacing blame for racist police violence onto its victims. By a like
logic, we should see abolition of felony murder itself as a racial justice remedy, a prophylactic against the kind of discriminatory prosecution and selectively disproportionate punishment described here.
Abolition of felony murder is far off, as 41 states, the federal system, and
D.C. retain felony murder rules conditioned on no more than negligence towards death. Thus felony murder abolition is not a single reform, but many
reforms in many places. Abolishing felony murder as a prophylactic against
discrimination is less a policy conclusion than a framework for investigation
and advocacy. At this stage, it requires gathering data and collecting stories
about prosecution and adjudication in particular jurisdictions. It is a job for
community advocates, journalists, scholars, and, public officials—including
hopefully, some in law enforcement. That work may yield particular reforms
smaller—or larger—than repealing felony murder.
As in other areas of criminal justice, the goal of abolition need not be
inconsistent with the path of incremental reform.450 Take the death penalty as
an historical example. Believing that our nation would abandon capital punishment if forced to impose it even-handedly, abolitionists attacked its
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discretionary and discriminatory procedures, and temporarily achieved abolition.451 Since the death penalty’s almost immediate restoration, death penalty abolitionists have waged a procedural war of attrition against every execution, reducing the appeal of capital prosecution to prosecutors and thereby
eroding support among the penalty’s most effective advocates.452 So too, the
incremental reform and restriction of felony murder may diminish its appeal
to prosecutors and pave the path to its eventual abolition.453
To be clear, we make no claim that this path to felony murder abolition is
Abolitionist in the largest sense. Abolition of felony murder liability is far
from a radical goal, having won the support of such architects of modern penality as Bentham and Wechsler. And we have considered other reforms here
to better enable prosecution of police violence. These include introducing depraved indifference murder in jurisdictions without it, expanding depraved
indifference murder to include deaths resulting from reckless and depraved
endangerment of individuals in jurisdictions like Minnesota, and enacting
civil rights violation felonies. As we have acknowledged, these proposals to
punish unduly violent police presuppose the persistence of the penal state.
And one of our motivating principles is neutral regarding the penal state: the
imperative to deprivilege police, and reaffirm the equal civil status of all.
However many or few offenses we continue to punish, however often and
however severely, we must also prosecute and punish police who commit
them.
Nevertheless, as things stand, we can expect that shortcuts to punishment
will not be deployed primarily against police. We have seen that Minnesota
and Georgia are outliers in giving prosecutors less room for maneuver in
cases of unintended homicide, surely one factor in explaining the felony murder charges against Chauvin and Rolfe. No doubt another factor is wanting
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to assure success in high profile prosecutions by making prosecution easy, a
goal that, we next argue, comes at an underappreciated cost.
B. Felony Murder, Mens Rea and the Cloaking of Racial Contempt
Faced with the opportunity to convict police officers in high profile cases
such as the killings of George Floyd and Rayshard Brooks, one might believe
the prize of conviction worth these hidden costs. Whether proximate cause
felony murder convictions shift blame in other sorts of cases does not erase
its value in securing convictions of killer cops who might otherwise get away
with their crimes. But even where felony murder is used to convict unjustifiable police killings we should hesitate to think a shortcut has won the day.
Applying a felony murder rule deforms the meaning of the underlying crime,
leaving us unable to grapple with and condemn the mens rea of police who
kill unjustifiably. Perhaps most importantly, in cases where our outrage centers on the history of police violence towards people of color, felony murder
prosecution can render criminal law expressively silent and racist policing
unaddressed.
Calling police killings felony murders is unsatisfying for reasons captured
by the familiar criticisms of felony murder explored in Part II.456 But those
defects have special importance given the social salience of prosecuting police violence. Recall that felony murder imposes liability for murder for an
unintended and even inadvertent killing during a dangerous felony.457 The
very point of such a rule is to elide the fact the defendant did not have the
culpability otherwise required for murder, because the killer intended a different wrong. Whether we characterize felony murder liability as a “transfer”
of intent from the felony to the killing, or as negligent homicide aggravated
by a felonious motive, is immaterial. Either characterization implies that the
killer’s culpability towards death alone did not suffice for murder liability.
That may be justified where a felon kills inadvertently for some other bad
end.458 But it cannot be justified where there is no secondary goal. This is
precisely why the “merger rule” carves out some potential cases of felony
murder from prosecution; in those cases the crime is too similar to less serious
homicide offenses.459 A predicate felony of assault or battery contributes insufficient additional mens rea to an unintended killing.460 In such a case, a
felony murder charge allows the prosecution to avoid its obligation to prove
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s killing was culpable enough
to warrant condemnation as murder.461
This same deficiency can render felony murder convictions unsatisfying
even when they lead to the conviction of rogue police. As we have seen,
Judge Peter Cahill’s sentencing memorandum appropriately considered the
great wrong Derek Chauvin did.462 Cahill concluded that Chauvin knowingly
imposed an enormous risk of death, explicitly rejecting Floyd’s pleas for his
life, for the very purpose of degrading and terrorizing him.463 At a more abstract level, the jury’s verdict of depraved indifference murder expressed this
as well. But sadly, the jury’s verdict of felony murder predicated on assault—
the only murder conviction likely to survive appeal—did not.
To watch Chauvin kneeling on George Floyd’s neck, impervious to
Floyd’s begging for breath and the pleas by bystanders, is to watch someone
kill with either intent or utter and cruel indifference. Recasting this as an unlawful assault with an unintended outcome likens this killing to an unlucky
punch. Felony murder, by definition, does not require intentional or reckless
killing and so cannot capture the wrong Chauvin inflicted—or for that matter,
the recklessness of so many of the police killings we have described.464 By
restricting depraved indifference murder to diffuse risks in the Noor case,
Minnesota has effectively decided that sadistically and fatally forcing an individual to beg for his life, is not sufficiently culpable to count as murder.465
But by imposing felony murder with no merger rule, the same court has decided that an unlucky punch is more naturally described as murder. Must we
then hope that when Minnesota someday adopts a merger limit or abolishes
felony murder, it does so only prospectively? In this case, in this place, felony
murder was the only possible murder charge, leaving what was most blameworthy in Chauvin’s conduct uncondemned.
Some might think this the quite ordinary trade-off at the heart of the felony murder doctrine. If the trade-off between giving prosecutors an easier
road to punish rogue cops is a less bespoke measuring of their guilty mind,
then so be it. After all, insisting on a conviction that centers Chauvin’s mens
rea or another officer’s reckless and rash conduct may be much more difficult
to prove; indeed, the challenge may leave prosecutors unable to secure a conviction. Would we be willing to risk the prosecution’s success, to insist on a
more precise match between culpability and punishment?
But in these important cases of police violence such a trade-off does not
merely lack nuance; it surrenders the very expressive heart of criminal
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punishment.466 To be sure, any unjustified police violence is lamentable; injury or death by the very agency we have collectively organized for public
safety is disturbing. But we ought not mince words: the most destabilizing
images of police violence over the past months and years have been of police
shootings of Black and Brown men.467 These cases of police violence read as
part of a historical lament; Tamir Rice, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Philando Castile, George Floyd, Rayshard Brooks, Jacob Blake… The litany
feels endless. The pain enflamed by these killings is due to the conviction that
police find deadly violence too easy and life too cheap when aimed at Black
people. Generations of Black complaints about policing, stretching back
throughout the nation’s history, are being recognized by a broad cross-section
of Americans.468 Whether inspecting an individual officer’s actions or
broader police tactics in minority neighborhoods, the nationwide swell of
protest reflected a refusal to ignore the racism that drives so much police violence.
But this is precisely the cost of using felony murder to impose punishment
on police violence. Casting police killings of minorities as unintentional, incidental killings, ignores the racism in case after case of lethal police violence. Prosecuting such killings, without inspection of the police officer’s
mens rea, hides away the precise feature nationwide protests have insisted we
must face. By premising liability on an adjacent crime—the dangerous discharge of a weapon, for example—we are precluded not only from determining the critical mens rea as to the actual killing but also from inspecting the
role of racism in that killing. The very central question of the current political
conversation—would this officer have responded with similar violence were
the now dead victim white?—becomes inaccessible and legally unimportant.
To be sure, proving that an officer’s violence stemmed from racism is no
small feat.469 Some prosecutions may face the steep legal requirements to
prove a Federal Civil Rights Violation. Other cases will be tried or sentenced
under state hate crimes legislation. In other cases, the role race plays in determining reckless or irrational behavior may stretch our current hate crime
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regimes.470 In many cases prosecutors are loathe to inject explosive questions
of race into criminal cases. Despite these obstacles, we should do what we
can to make racist violence more visible; to speak its name.
This may sound like an abstract diversion, of interest only to punishment
theorists. It may seem a luxury to insist on not only the right punishment, but
also the right justification for punishment. Yet the stakes here are not academic. If criminal law is legitimate at all, its purpose must be not to threaten
but to persuade, protect and include. A political community’s criminal laws
should express the minimal standards of decent treatment it requires as a token of mutual respect. Such respect depends not only on how others treat us,
but on what that treatment communicates. A central challenge of reforming
policing has been the long-standing insistence from minority communities
that racism in policing be directly addressed. Even successful prosecutions of
unjustified police violence fail if they refuse to address its racism. Police violence is not only excessive. It has persisted because it is selectively excessive against our least privileged. If they leave what is understood unsaid,
prosecutions of police can leave these targeted communities short-changed,
deceived and unseen. Communities of color can hardly feel protected against
racist violence by prosecutions that treat it as unintended.
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